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 Between its creation in 1972 and 2001, the development of its institutions 
was a major focus of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore. The local Church 
sought to move away from its Colonial-era reliance on foreign resources through the 
localization of its leadership upon the appointment of its first local Archbishop in 
1977 consolidating all Catholics under its leadership, thus ending the state of dual 
jurisdiction with the Diocese of Macau; and through the creation of Saint Francis 
Xavier Major Seminary and the Singapore Pastoral Institute to provide previously 
lacking local theological instruction. Simultaneously, the Archdiocese worked 
towards the ideal established by the Second Vatican Council to promote greater lay 
participation through the introduction of Parish Councils. However, such 
institutional growth on the part of the Church occasionally created tensions 
between itself and the Singaporean State.  These tensions in the realm of education 
will be explored through case studies about the State's sterilization for Primary One 
priority admission scheme; the Religious Knowledge experiment; and the 
introduction of Independent Schools. Further Church-State tensions stemming from 
the Archdiocese's institutional development will also be examined in relation to the 
1987 'Marxist Conspiracy'. Based on the examination of these two areas, I argue that 
whenever the Archdiocese approached such potential conflicts, it chose the 
pragmatic option that prevented escalation into a full-blown conflict and 
simultaneously allowed it to preserve as much of its institutional strength as possible, 
even at the expense of failing to defend its principles, albeit tempered by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On 9 August 1965, the Republic of Singapore came into being after its 
secession from the Federation of Malaysia. The reasons for this separation are 
complex and for the most part irrelevant to this thesis.1 The two states were now 
free to follow their own paths, and this included their various churches. On 22 Dec 
1972, the Archdiocese of Singapore was reorganized out of the existing Archdiocese 
of Malacca-Singapore. The Malaysian states of Johor and Malacca, previously under 
Singapore’s ecclesiastical authority, were organized into a new diocese and, along 
with Penang, were placed under the new Archdiocese of Kuala Lumpur. This left the 
Archdiocese of Singapore with a jurisdiction corresponding to the borders of the 
Republic of Singapore.2 That this separation of the churches along national lines took 
seven years to achieve is the result of the slow-moving nature of the Catholic Church 
and inertia stemming from the fact that the Singaporean and Malaysian churches 
had been united for nearly two centuries as parts of religious territories that had no 
reference to the borders of 1965 or the intra-colonial borders which had preceded 
them.3  The separation into ‘national’ churches was thus an event that saw "the 
parting [of] way[s] of two Sister churches."4  
                                                          
1
 For an account of the details behind the separation, see: Albert Lau, Moment of Anguish: 
Singapore in Malaysia and Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 
1998); C. M. Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819-2005, Revised edition (Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2009), 287–295; Jean E. Abshire, History of Singapore, The Greenwood Histories 
of the Modern Nations (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), 129–130. 
2
 Robert P. Balhetchet, “Metamorphosis of a Church: A Study on the People of God in the 
Republic of Singapore: Analysis and Projection” (Doctoral Dissertation, Pontificia Studiorum 
Universitas a Sancto Thoma Aquinate in Urbe, Faculty of Theology, 1976), 35. 
3
 For details regarding the various religious territories Singapore and Malaysia were jointly 
parts of in the past, see: E. Wijeysingha and René Nicolas, Going Forth... The Catholic Church 
in Singapore 1819-2004 (Singapore: His Most Rev. Nicholas Chia, 2006), 71–151; P. Decroix, 
History of the Church and Churches in Malaysia and Singapore (1511-2000) (Penang: Fr. P. 
Decroix M.E.P., 2005), 264–330. 
4
 Decroix, History of the Church 334. 
[2] 
 
 This thesis will seek to explore the development of the Archdiocese of 
Singapore as an autonomous Church from its creation in 1972 till the retirement of 
the late Archbishop Gregory Yong in 2001. (I characterize the Archdiocese as 
‘autonomous’ rather than ‘independent’ here, because in accordance with the 
Catholic Church's Code of Canon Law, no Church is fully independent as the Pope 
holds "the primacy of ordinary power" over all of them.5) I will argue that since its 
formation the ‘national’ Church has been focused on developing its institutions and 
that these efforts were characterized by a pragmatism that saw the Archdiocese 
seek courses of action that preserved as much of its institutional strength as possible 
over standing up for its principles, particularly when it ran afoul of government 
policies that it disagreed with.  
 I will first define some of the key terms of my argument:  First, the Church's 
‘institutions’ comprise any organization set up or led by the Church. ‘Core 
institutions’ would refer to Church institutions key to its operation as a religious 
community such as its churches and seminary, and major outreach bodies such as its 
schools. In contrast ‘peripheral institutions’ would constitute Church outreach 
bodies with only a minor influence in Singaporean society such as the Justice and 
Peace Commission that it disbanded in the wake of the 1987 'Marxist Conspiracy'.6 
Second, ‘institutional development’ in the context of my thesis means the creation 
of new associated institutions and/or the refinement of existing ones to enhance the 
capabilities of the Church as a whole. Third, ‘institutional strength’ will refer to the 
scope with which the Church through its institutions can affect Singaporean society. 
Fourth, when I use the term ‘pragmatic’ in reference to the actions of the 
                                                          
5
 Libreria Editrice Vaticana, “Code of Canon Law, C. 333, §1,” The Code of Canon Law - 
Vatican Archive, accessed November 26, 2013, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__P16.HTM. 
6
 The definition for what constitutes an ‘institution’ and the dichotomy between ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ institutions were helpfully provided by the thesis's anonymous markers. 
[3] 
 
Archdiocese, it is not to be confused with general Singaporean pragmatism. Rather, I 
am describing its attitude when faced with conflict of seeking to safeguard the 
continuity of as many of its institutions as possible, preferably all of them, but 
tempered by a willingness if need be to sacrifice ‘peripheral institutions’ so as to 
preserve its ‘core institutions’.  
Literature review 
 Specialist secondary literature on the Singaporean Catholic Church is limited. 
There is only one book on its general history, Going Forth... The Catholic Church in 
Singapore 1819-2004 by Eugene Wijeysingha and René Nicolas that was 
commissioned and published by the Archbishop of Singapore in 2006. Going Forth 
however presents a wholly narrative account and is largely lacking in analysis. It is 
supplemented by Paul Decroix's History of the Church and Churches in Malaysia and 
Singapore (1511-2000). However, like Going Forth, this book is narrative in style, 
giving largely a detailed chronology of events. Furthermore, less than a quarter of its 
content is focused on Singapore. In addition, both books focus on quantitative issues 
such as the number of new churches founded or the growth in the number of 
Catholic schools. I shall seek to expand on this by making a more qualitative 
assessment of the local Church's development. 
 Another body of material on the Singapore Church includes histories of 
individual churches, such as James Newton Boss's history of the Portuguese Mission 
and a history of the Redemptorists in Malaysia and Singapore. However these 
mainly take the form of commemorative publications.7  
                                                          
7
 James Newton Boss, An Account of the Portuguese Mission in Singapore (1825-1999): 
Founding of St. Joseph’s Church (Singapore: James Newton Boss, 2009); The Congregation of 
the Most Holy Redeemer, Vice-Province of Malaysia and Singapore, Tree of Redemption : 
[4] 
 
 These books are further complemented by a collection of other works, 
typically academic theses. This literature can be divided into three broad categories. 
The first category is work dedicated to crafting a holistic history of the Singapore 
Church. An early example of this is local Eurasian Catholic priest and theological 
scholar Robert P. Balhetchet's 1976 study of the Church in Singapore's history, the 
demographic make-up of its membership, and their religiosity.  It argues that the 
Church fell short of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) ideals of what constitutes 
a Catholic community, particularly in terms of the laity’s spiritual knowledge and in 
an insufficient sense of belonging within the community. 8  
  Balhetchet's work was built upon by Clement Liew whose two theses 
examined the Church in colonial Singapore. In his Honours thesis, he argued that by 
the early 1900s increased local involvement in the Church’s missionary and pastoral 
activities, in the form of local catechists and the first locally born priests, meant that 
it was transiting from being a Mission to becoming a local Church.9 His subsequent 
Master's thesis showed that whilst the growth in the number of Church institutions 
and clergymen played a part, this transition was primarily the result of the evolution 
of social-political structures.10  
 Community building in the post-colonial Church has also been about 
promoting a sense of rootedness. In the colonial period, community building centred 
on rooting transient migrant workers to stay in Singapore and the local Church on a 
permanent basis through the development of specific enclaves or sub-communities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
People, Places, Pilgrims. (Singapore: C.Ss.R Vice-Province of Ipoh (Singapore-Malaysia), 2010); 
Wijeysingha and Nicolas, Going Forth... 
8
 Balhetchet, “Metamorphosis of a Church.” 
9
 Clement Liew, “The Roman Catholic Church of Singapore, 1819-1910: From Mission to 
Church” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of History, National University of Singapore, 1993). 
10
 Clement Liew, “Rooting a Church in an Immigrant Society: The Chinese Catholic 
Community of Singapore 1832 to 1935” (Master’s Thesis, Dept. of History, National 
University of Singapore, 1999). 
[5] 
 
After independence, it had instead transited into cultivating a sense of permanent 
community amongst Singaporean Catholics. The exploration of institutional 
developments and their roles in the cultivation of a sense of community amongst 
Singaporean Catholics is core to the studies of both Balhetchet and Liew. As such, 
my own exploration of the post-colonial period builds upon their earlier work. 
 A second category of scholarship examined the inner workings of the Church 
or some segment thereof.  An example is Julianna Lim's 1972 thesis on the impact of 
the Vatican II reforms on an anonymous parish, which argues that conservative 
implementation of these reforms coupled with the compartmentalization of religion 
had led to disenchantment among the younger, more liberal and enthusiastic 
members of the congregation.11  Sandra Chua's comparative study examines the 
level of lay participation in the administration of an unnamed parish. Chua concludes 
that whilst there was a high level of lay participation in this parish, the situation in 
other parishes was dependent on the attitude of parish's priests who held all final 
decision-making authority.12  Other Honours theses have looked at specific aspects 
of Church history not directly relevant to this study.13  
 The third group of studies on the Catholic Church in Singapore examines its 
interaction with the State. One example is the work on the 1987 "Marxist 
Conspiracy", the largest Church-State confrontation within the post-colonial period. 
                                                          
11
 Juliana Patricia Lim, “Response of Singaporean Catholics to Vatican II: A Study Done on One 
Parish Church” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1972). 
12
 Sandra Siat Lee Chua, “Democracy in Local Churches: Comparing a Catholic and a 
Methodist Church in Singapore” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of Sociology, National University of 
Singapore, 1993). 
13
 Clement Chua, “A Church within a Church?: A History of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal 
in Singapore, 1970s-1990s” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of History, National University of 
Singapore, 2007); Benjamin Chen, “Tracing the Development of the Chinese Catholic Church 
in Singapore: 1950-1980” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of History, National University of Singapore, 
2011); Nick Yongtai Chui, “Catholic Students in the National University of Singapore: Ideas 
and Identity 1951-1985” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of History, National University of Singapore, 
2005).
 
Chen, “Tracing the Development of the Chinese Catholic Church in Singapore: 1950-
1980.” Chui, “Catholic Students in the National University of Singapore.” 
[6] 
 
Most notably, Michael D. Barr argues that the confrontation led Archbishop Gregory 
Yong to the repression of controversial opinions within the local Church in a bid to 
prevent further aggravating the government.14 This is complemented by more broad 
based analyses such as  Jacob Chew's thesis, which argues that the backing down of 
the Church in 1987 has led to its being reduced to a role defined by the 
Establishment, thereby becoming a complicit agent in the maintenance of State 
stability with little hope of regaining a critical voice.15 
 There also exists a significant body of work on the Church's development in 
other countries. Many local churches came into conflict with the State. This is 
unsurprising as Christianity scholar Philip Jenkins argues that Churches will 
increasingly dispute the Enlightenment-derived assumption of the separation of 
Church and State, leading to the more systematic emergence of clerical political 
activists who will create within their societies a distinctively Christian strand in 
politics,16 in many cases leading to some form of clash between Church and State. It 
is clear that such conflicts have already been taking place for several decades. 
  In the Philippines, for example, both Antonio F Moreno and Julius Bautista 
observe that the Church is heavily involved in politics and trace the roots of this 
involvement to its crucial role in the People Power Revolution of 1986.17 Moreno 
argues that the Church functions as the self-proclaimed guarantor of democracy in 
                                                          
14
 Michael   D. Barr, “Marxists in Singapore? Lee Kuan Yew’s Campaign against Catholic Social 
Justice Activists in the 1980s,” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (2010): 335–62. 
15
 Jacob Anthony Boon Teik Chew, “The Catholic Church in Singapore’s Civil Society: A Cog in 
the One-Dimensional Machine?” (Honours Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, National 
University of Singapore, 2005). 
16
 Phillip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 161–162. 
17
 Antonio F. Moreno, Church, State, and Civil Society in Postauthoritarian Philippines: 
Narratives of Engaged Citizenship, 1st ed. (Manila: Ateneo De Manila Univ Press, 2008), 59–
68; Julius Bautista, “Church and State in the Philippines: Tackling Life Issues in a ‘Culture Of 
Death,’” Sojourn 25, no. 1 (2010): 32–34. 
[7] 
 
the Philippines.18 Bautista goes a step further and argues that the Church has 
assumed the self-proclaimed role of "regulator of public and political affairs of the 
nation" (including matters such as reproductive health) as opposed to simply 
focusing on specifically “democratic” processes and structures. 19  
 Another example of a Church-State conflict is Hong Kong after the 1997 
handover to Chinese rule. Initially, Beatrice K. F. Leung has noted, the Church sought 
to maintain the colonial era pattern of assisting the government in the provision of 
education and social services. However, these efforts quickly fell apart as the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government began to distance itself 
from religious organizations, including the Church. This coupled with the view by the 
Vatican of Hong Kong as a beachhead to support mainland Catholics which was at 
odds with PRC policy, led to antagonism between the Church and the HKSAR 
government. This antagonism was epitomized in protests by the Church's leadership 
in 2002 and 2003 against the HKSAR government's drafting and passing of a new 
national security law.20 This redefined relationship between Church and State is also 
observed by Deborah A. Brown, who argues that since the handover the Hong Kong 
Church has come under pressure from leaders in both Beijing and the HKSAR, in the 
face of which it has chosen to be a counter witness and independent civil society 
voice.21 
 In this thesis, I will explore the Church's encounter with the Singaporean 
State in the realm of education and the most high profile example of a Church-State 
                                                          
18
 Moreno, Church, State, and Civil Society, 19–20. 
19
 Bautista, “Church and State,” 31. 
20
 Beatrice K. F. Leung, “Catholic Church Relations with the Hong Kong SAR Government : The 
Paradigm Shift,” in “One Country, Two Systems” in Crisis : Hong Kong’s Transformation since 
the Handover, ed. Yiu-chung Wong (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 113–35. 
21
 Deborah A. Brown, “Hong Kong’s Catholic Church and the Challenge of Democratization in 
the Special Administrative Region,” in Religious Organizations and Democratization : Case 




clash in post-colonial Singapore, the 1987 "Marxist Conspiracy", and examine what 
patterns emerge from these points of interaction.  We must first consider the 
relations the Singapore State has with the Church as covered in the work of Chew 
and Barr discussed earlier. There is also a wider body of literature on the relations of 
the Singapore State and religion in general. Eugene K. B. Tan characterizes this 
relationship as the government taking a pragmatic, in the general sense of the word, 
approach to religion: recognizing that it is impossible to fully separate religion from 
the public sphere, the State seeks to maintain the dominance of the secular and its 
own hegemony over the public sphere whilst allowing the occasional religious 
intrusion.22 
  Mathew Mathews in his examination of the state's relationship with the 
Protestant churches agrees that the State desires significant control over religion, 
especially in the wake of the 1987 "Marxist Conspiracy". Mathews further argues 
that the State is interested in keeping Christians within the role of promoting 
community bonding and development; a social welfare provider; and a moral guide 
for citizens.23 This agenda on the part of the Singaporean State is very similar to the 
examples just mentioned. There are, however, specific differences that make 
Singapore's circumstances unique; I will seek to demonstrate that the Archdiocese 
of Singapore has pursued a pragmatic approach to its relations with the State 
whereby it avoids irritating the government and the associated risk of prompting a 
crackdown that would threaten its efforts at institutional development.   
Sources/Methodology 
                                                          
22
 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Keeping Politics and Religion Separate in the Public Square: Managed 
Pluralism and the Regulatory State in Singapore,” in The Politics of Religion in South and 
Southeast Asia, ed. Ishtiaq Ahmed (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 195–224. 
23
 Mathew Mathews, “Accommodating Relationships: The Church and the State in Singapore,” 
in Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict, ed. Julius Bautista and Francis 
Khek Gee Lim (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 184–200. 
[9] 
 
 Through the course of my research I have made use of both documents and 
a series of interviews. I relied heavily on the Catholic News (CN), the Archdiocese's 
official newspaper. It has provided me with information on events and 
developments, as well as the attitudes of the Archdiocesan hierarchy. It also 
regularly published letters sent by public who are often but not always laypeople..  
 I have also consulted internal documents of the Church and the specific 
institutions under examination.  The Archdiocese lacks a publicly accessible central 
archive, and many individual institutions do not maintain their own. (My research is 
further complicated by the fact that as the period under examination is relatively 
recent, many documents are not yet publicly available.) Examples of documents that 
I have been able to obtain include reports on Catholic education in Singapore; 
documents outlining how a parish should be run; and commemorative publications 
by various institutions.  
 These written sources are supplemented by a series of twenty six oral 
interviews with informed Catholics: fourteen men and twelve women. Five are 
priests; six are religious, i.e. members of specific Orders; and the remaining fifteen 
are laypeople. All were at least twelve years old between 1972 and 2001, the 
timeframe of the thesis.  
 An exhaustive analysis of all aspects of all the institutional developments 
undertaken by the Archdiocese is beyond the limits of this project. I have therefore 
limited myself to English sources, as it is the primary language of the Singapore 
Church. My study focuses on three specific sub-topics: the creation and 
development of some key institutions in the Archdiocese; Catholic education in 
Singapore; and the impact of the 'Marxist Conspiracy'.  
[10] 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 Chapter 2 will begin with a brief summary of the Archdiocese's efforts at 
developing itself into a truly autonomous entity. It will also illustrate how the 
Archdiocese cultivated a greater sense of lay participation (encouraged by Vatican II) 
through the creation of parish councils. In this chapter, I will argue that these 
attempts to consolidate the Archdiocese institutionally were largely successful, 
eliminating much of its reliance on institutions outside Singapore for such functions 
as training its priests and providing its laity a theological education.  
 This process of institutional development, however, was relatively 
uncontroversial and generally focused on the more ‘internal’ aspects of the Diocese. 
More significant were those institutions which entailed a greater degree of contact 
with the non-Catholic public and with the State itself, thus increasing the potential 
for conflict and confrontation. Chapter 3 will examine the local Catholic education 
system, which constituted a key area of contact. It will illustrate some of the changes 
introduced by the State between 1972 and 2001, such as the case of the sterilization 
priority in the Primary One admission exercise, the introduction and subsequent 
removal of Religious Knowledge as an examinable subject, and the introduction of 
independent schools. The chapter will study how the Archdiocese and the Catholic 
schools have responded to these changes.  
 Disagreements over educational issues were, however, dramatically 
outweighed by the painful confrontation between the Church and the Singaporean 
State in 1987 known as the 'Marxist Conspiracy'. Chapter Four will focus on this 
confrontation to analyze the choices made by the Diocese and discuss the 
significance of the 'Marxist Conspiracy' for the Church in the long-run, particularly 
[11] 
 




Chapter 2: Institutional Developments 
 Between 1972 and 2001, institutional development was a major focus of the 
Archdiocese of Singapore. Newly limited to the boundaries of Singapore, the 
Archdiocese now had a national character that its predecessors, straddling both 
Singapore and Malaysia, did not. This in turn added a tinge of national pride into the 
Archdiocese as it was now the embodiment of Singaporean Catholicism to the world. 
Spurred on by this and its status as a young Church, the Archdiocese naturally 
sought to equip itself with the institutions of an autonomous national church. 
 The local Church sought to enhance its capabilities through the creation of 
new associated institutions and/or the refinement of existing ones. Its institutions 
encompassed a wide range of bodies falling within three broad categories: those 
which helped facilitate the functioning of the Archdiocese such as the Secretariat; 
those which helped to train its vital resources, like its seminary; and those which 
allowed it to engage with the broader Singaporean society such as its schools. (The 
focus of this thesis will be the second and third categories.) The Church's institutions 
can also be divided between "core institutions", bodies vital to the Archdiocese's 
operations such as its parishes and major outreach bodies such as its homes for the 
needy; and supplementary Archdiocesan administrative organizations, such as the 
Catholic Archdiocesan Education Centre, and outreach bodies with limited reach in 
society like the smaller lay ministries which collectively make up its "peripheral 
institutions".   
 The Church's process of development was aimed towards increasing its 
institutional strength. This strength translated in practical terms into the 
Archdiocese's ability via its internal institutions to produce resources vital to its 
operations such as its priests, bishops and theologically trained lay leaders. 
[13] 
 
Simultaneously, the Church being the representative of the Catholics of Singapore 
was not content to remain mute. It thus desired a voice and role in society to 
expound its teachings, express the needs of those it served and contribute to the 
betterment of Singapore. As such, part of its institutional strength can be measured 
through the number, quality and reach of the Archdiocese's outreach bodies that 
enabled it to do so.  
 The Archdiocese I argue pursued a policy of pragmatism, whereby in a desire 
to maintain its maximum possible institutional strength, as represented by its core 
institutions, it was willing to sacrifice both its principles and peripheral institutions. 
This pragmatism will be further explored in the following chapters. 
 This chapter will examine a number of the internal steps the Archdiocese 
undertook as part of this institutional development process. It will focus on how the 
Archdiocese used internal institutional development to face two major concerns: 
Firstly, it had to move away from being a colonial Church reliant in many ways on 
overseas sources for leadership and theological training. To accomplish this, it first 
transferred its leadership from a missionary to an Asian Archbishop through the 
appointment of Archbishop Yong in 1977. Upon his appointment, Archbishop Yong 
worked towards consolidating the leadership of local Catholics by ending the state 
of dual jurisdiction over Singaporean Catholics. He also spearheaded the efforts by 
the Archdiocese at expanding its ability to provide training of its own priests and lay 
leaders through the founding of the Saint Francis Xavier Minor Seminary (SFXMS), 
and the formation of SPI to provide the laity with theological training. 
 The second major concern was the need to keep in line with the broader 
post-Vatican II reforms that were sweeping the universal Church. This chapter will 
focus on the Archdiocese's efforts to promote increased lay participation via the 
[14] 
 
introduction of Parish Councils and Parish Pastoral Councils (PPCs).  It will 
demonstrate that whilst being relatively slow in implementing change, the local 
Church nevertheless was ultimately successful in doing so. 
The appointment of the first Asian Archbishop 
 The first challenge faced by the Archdiocese in its efforts to wean itself off 
the colonial-era reliance on foreign resources was the need to transition to local 
executive leadership. When it was created in 1972, the last Archbishop of the now 
defunct Archdiocese of Malacca-Singapore, Michael Olçomendy was appointed its 
new Archbishop. Olçomendy was born in France in 1901. He temporarily assumed 
leadership over Singapore's Catholics in 1945 during the Japanese Occupation.24  His 
leadership was made permanent in January 1947 by his elevation to the position of 
Bishop of Malacca. He would remain the leader of the Singapore Church through the 
1955 and 1972 reorganizations that saw the creation of new dioceses under Asian 
bishops, leaving him the last missionary to head any ecclesiastical territory in the 
Malayan Peninsula.  
 In 1977 Archbishop Olçomendy resigned as Archbishop of Singapore and his 
successor was declared to be the then Bishop of Penang, Bishop Gregory Yong. He 
was officially installed as Archbishop of Singapore in February 1977.25 Despite being 
Malaysian by birth, Yong was considered part of the local clergy because, firstly, 
there was no distinction between the Singaporean and the Peninsular Malaysian 
                                                          
24
  De Rozario, J. R., “Rt. Rev. M. Olçomendy, Archbishop of Singapore,” in Archbishop’s 
Sacerdotal Golden Jubilee, 1926-1976 : Souvenir Magazine, ed. Rev. S. Fernandez (Singapore: 
Cathedral of the Good Shepherd, 1976), 14–15. During the Occupation, the Japanese 
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ecclesiastical territories and clergy before 1972. Secondly, he had extensive 
experience working within the Singapore Church having taught at the SFXMS at 
various times between the 1940s and 1960s and his service in various Singapore 
parishes in the 1950s and for most of 1965.26 Lastly, because Singaporean Catholics 
in general do not particularly consider their Malaysian coreligionists, especially 
Peninsular Malaysians, as being foreign. Archbishop Yong resigned in 2000 at the 
age of seventy five.27  
 Between 1972 and 2001, the Archdiocese of Singapore thus transitioned 
from missionary leadership to leadership by local clergy. However, the majority of 
the priests in Singapore remained missionaries: 55 out of the total 95 in 1978.28  This 
reliance on missionary priests, both foreign-born and locals who joined the 
missionary religious orders and thus subject to redeployment elsewhere at the 
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Table 1 Demographics of Priests in 
Singapore between 1974 and 2001 
 











1974 24 67 91 
1978 40 55 95 
1982 44 52 96 
1986 49 66 115 
1990 53 65 118 
1994 59 56 115 
1998 62 66 128 
2001 63 67 130 
 
 Throughout the twenty five years, missionaries always made up at least half 
of the total number of priests in the Archdiocese. Since then, however, the 
Archdiocese has made significant progress in increasing the proportion of local 
diocesan priests (those permanently attached to the Archdiocese) from 24 of 91 in 
1974 to a rough parity in comparison with the missionaries by the mid-1990s. Given 
the relatively small size of the Singaporean Catholic community and the small 
number of men taking up vocations, it would have been almost impossible to 
replace all those missionaries. Despite this limitation, the transition of executive 
leadership from missionaries to local priests showed that the Archdiocese possessed 
the capacity to produce leaders of quality from within its own clergy. 
The end of dual jurisdiction 
 Upon his appointment as Archbishop, Yong moved to end the dual 
jurisdiction of Singapore's Catholics, which dated back to the nineteenth century, 
when a conflict raged between the Portuguese Mission and the Société des Missions 
[17] 
 
Étrangères de Paris (M.E.P.) over the jurisdiction of the Catholics in Singapore.29 It 
was not until June 1886 that a Concordat was signed between Pope Leo XII and King 
Dom Louis I of Portugal to resolve these conflicts; it established two separate 
jurisdictions on the island, with Catholics formerly under the Portuguese Mission's 
parish of St. Joseph's Church, Victoria Street coming under Macau whilst those in the 
various parishes founded and run by the French Mission would remain under its 
authority.30  In 1888, the M.E.P.'s jurisdiction over Singapore came under the 
previously defunct Diocese of Malacca when it was reactivated. In 1955, the Diocese 
was itself reorganized and renamed the Archdiocese of Malacca-Singapore.31  
Therefore when the Archdiocese of Singapore came into being in 1972, it inherited 
the jurisdictional authority of the M.E.P but not that of the Portuguese Mission, 
which still remained under Macau.  
 As part of its efforts to strengthen its position as the representative of all 
Singaporean Catholics, the Archdiocese of Singapore moved swiftly to rectify this 
divisive legacy, reaching an agreement with the Diocese of Macau to arrange for the 
handover of jurisdiction. Along with transferring the Church of Saint Joseph, Victoria 
Street and its parishioners to the Archdiocese of Singapore, the July 1977 agreement 
also stipulated that St. Joseph would cease to be a parish but would continue to 
function as a church of devotion,32 meaning that the church would continue to serve 
as a place of worship and provider of parish services to any Catholics who went 
there but would cease to possess authority over a particular group of people.33  The 
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Archdiocese could now legitimately say that it represented all Catholics in Singapore. 
This development only affected the approximately 7,000 parishioners of St. Joseph's 
Church out of a total Catholic population of 98,070 in 1981.34 Nevertheless, it was 
psychologically significant that the Archdiocese no longer had to share local 
authority with a distant foreign diocese, thus resolving a dispute that had plagued 
the Singapore Church for over a hundred years and furthering the growth of the 
national Church community by consolidating all Catholics under one unified local 
hierarchy.  
The founding of Saint Francis Xavier Major Seminary (SFXMS) 
 Archbishop Yong also sought to reduce the Archdiocese's need for foreign 
resources by expanding its ability to provide local theological education through the 
founding of SFXMS and the creation of the Singapore Pastoral Institute (SPI). The 
establishment of SFXMS was prompted by unexpected changes in Malaysian 
immigration policies in 1982. When the Archdiocese of Singapore came into being in 
1972, it remained reliant on the colonial-era regional seminary, the College General 
in Penang to complete the training of its priests. There had been a minor seminary in 
Singapore since 1925, which provided instruction in the humanities and sciences to 
its seminarians comparable to their peers in other schools. 35 In the Singapore 
context, this meant teaching the seminarians Latin and preparing them for their GCE 
A-levels.36 However, the Archdiocese lacked a major seminary to provide its 
seminarians the spiritual formation and preparation for their future duties and thus 
had to have them sent up to Penang.37  
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 The College General was originally founded by the M.E.P in Ayutthaya (Siam), 
in 1665 and after a number of moves in 1808, it settled in Penang, where it 
continues to operate till this day. It was established with the explicit purpose of 
training local clergy to first complement and ultimately to gradually replace the 
foreign missionaries. Till 1983 it served as the regional seminary for the Bishops' 
Conference of Malaysia-Singapore and Brunei, the permanent institution that brings 
together the various bishops in the three countries and serves as an intermediary 
governing body between the region's dioceses and the Vatican.38 
 However, this long-standing arrangement would come to an end in 1983. In 
early 1982, representatives of the Malaysian government met with the staff of the 
College General and informed them that as it did not recognize the College as an 
institute of higher learning it would not be issuing new student visas for Singaporean 
seminarians or renewing the visas of existing Singaporean seminarians when they 
expired. This immediately affected twenty seven Singaporeans then studying in 
Penang; more importantly, it meant that the Archdiocese of Singapore could no 
longer send its seminarians there.39 
 In response the Archdiocese announced in December 1982 that priests from 
Singapore would now receive their full training from the local Saint Francis Xavier 
seminary, with the first academic year of its new Major Seminary starting in January 
1983 with Father Noel Chin serving as its first Rector.40 The launch of what would 
become the new Major Seminary was inaugurated by Archbishop Yong in February 
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1983.41 The existing Minor Seminary was temporarily restructured whilst plans were 
made for the construction of a separate Major Seminary in Ponggol.42 The project 
was funded from the pool of money that had been derived from the sale of the 
original land of the College General in Penang, which had relocated to a more 
modest premise, and which had been set aside for the purposes of founding new 
seminaries within the Conference.43 The new Major Seminary was officially opened 
in January 1988 with an Open House which attracted more than 20,000 visitors.44 
 In the Archbishop’s homily during the mass where he inaugurated the Major 
Seminary, he described it as the "'the heart of the Archdiocese. For just as the heart 
pumps blood into the body to keep every part alive and functioning so the seminary 
produces priests to keep members of the mystical body of Christ alive and 
functioning in the order of grace."45 SFXMS's founding thereby meant that the 
Archdiocese was no longer reliant on overseas institutions to train its priests.  It was 
not however wholly self-reliant as the Archdiocese was too shorthanded to provide 
all of the necessary teaching staff, so for certain subjects priests had to be brought 
in from Penang and India. For the large part however its staff remained sourced 
from the local clergy, with some staff balancing their teaching responsibilities in the 
seminary with their duties in the parishes.46  
 The quality of the formation at SFXMS was however questioned through the 
course of my interviews; respondents felt that it lacked the cosmopolitan character 
of Penang's College General.  SFXMS had from its founding in 1983 possessed a large 
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proportion of Malaysians within its cohort.47 However, this hardly served to make 
SFXMS cosmopolitan and was a far cry from the days when students from across 
South and East Asia graced the College General's halls. Furthermore, the number of 
foreign seminarians declined over time.48 Between 1983 and 2001, the only foreign 
priests that graduated from SFXMS were eight Malaysians and a Bruneian.49 
Significantly, however, SFXMS produced twenty-seven local priests from the time of 
its founding in 1983 till the end of my study in 2001.50  
The formation of the Singapore Pastoral Institute (SPI) 
 The second component in Yong's effort at expanding local theological 
education was the creation of the Singapore Pastoral Institute (SPI) in 1978. The 
Institute provided theological education to lay Singaporean Catholics through the 
organization of courses which sought to help participants better understand their 
faith and its relevance in today's society.51 SPI began its first courses in July 1978 
with 340 participants. It was blessed and officially opened by Archbishop Yong in 
September.52 
 Together, SFXMS and SPI helped to provide lay Catholics with formal 
education above and beyond the catechesis they received as children or during their 
preparation for conversion. SFXMS, whose courses were also open to the laity, 
provided advanced university level academic courses on Catholic theology and 
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philosophy.53 In contrast SPI provided a more basic and practical education on the 
Catholic faith in three areas: biblical studies; catechetical training; and pastoral 
courses.54 SFXMS and SPI filled the gap that had previously forced many lay Catholics 
to turn either to overseas theological institutes or to local Protestant ones to better 
their understanding of their faith. 
 In its first three years of operation, SPI had 1,006 participants in its courses 
or an average yearly enrolment of 302.55  This figure would grow larger in the 1990s, 
to about 400.56 SPI trained about 9,200 students in the twenty three years between 
its founding in 1978 and 2001 out of a Catholic population that the 2000 
government census had numbered at 118,980.57 These low figures suggest that only 
a small number of lay Catholics made the effort to attend SPI, and many of these 
participants were regulars who attended different courses each year.58  In the 
context of a generally non-participatory Singaporean Church, however, these figures 
are generally regarded as respectable.59   
 The SPI has suffered from a perception that the quality of its instruction was 
poor. One complaint raised was that its courses were too focused on providing 
training for specific things, such as training catechists or preparing facilitators for the 
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Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults or some other specific ministry.60 It was also 
criticized for lacking variety and depth in its pastoral offerings, providing only basic 
teachings on spiritual growth.61  Interviewees felt that SPI should be offering more 
advanced theological training as well. SPI was also not seen as being academically 
rigorous enough, as the majority of its courses had only optional assignments.62 The 
overall perception is that SPI offers only the most basic theological training, leaving a 
gap between its lay-oriented courses and the advanced courses offered at SFXMS for 
clergy. Some Catholics have continued to opt for studies at Protestant institutions.63 
In response to these complaints SPI took steps to introduce intermediate courses 
such as hosting local tuition for distance learning for a Diploma in Theological 
Studies from the Australian Catholic University between 1996 and 1999 and 
introducing the Diploma of Adult Faith Formation program in 1999.64   
Increased lay participation through Parish Councils 
 The Archdiocese sought to remain abreast with trends in the universal 
Catholic Church originating from the reforms of Vatican II, which rather than 
proclaiming new dogmas, instead reinterpreted the old, bringing about a series of 
progressive changes throughout all facets of the Church without making a break 
with its ancient tradition.65  One key reinterpretation was in terms of lay 
participation, for which Vatican II sought to broaden the scope whilst maintaining 
the subordination of the laity to the clergy.  
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 An example of promotion of increased lay participation has been the 
development of Parish Councils, designed to introduce lay representatives into the 
decision-making process. This idea was first outlined in the Vatican II Decree Christus 
Dominus, which advocated the creation of a pastoral council that brought together 
selected members of the clergy, religious and laity at the diocesan level.66 The 1983 
Code of Canon Law encouraged the formation of councils at the parish level, though 
it limited the scope of their authority to a consultative vote in the administration of 
parish affairs and further subjected them to norms established by the local bishop. 67 
 By 1987 all of Singapore's twenty six parishes had Parish Councils, made up 
of lay leaders who assisted the priest in the running of the parish's day-to-day 
affairs.68 However, the actual scope for lay participation varied considerably as the 
Archdiocese did not stipulate the norms it expected, as required by Canon Law.69 
Individual parishes drafted their own constitutions; by 1987, eighty one percent had 
done so.70  With no common Archdiocesan constitution, priests could influence the 
drafting of their respective parishes’ constitution according to their own views.  
 The priests’ power was even more strongly maintained in the minority of 
parishes which lacked a constitution. Sandra Chua’s 1993 study concluded that 
whilst the laity did have some participation in the decision-making process within 
the parish, the priests made the final decisions on all matters spiritual, material and 
financial. Moreover, the meetings of both the priests and the Parish Council were 
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closed door affairs; there was no institutional or constitutionally sanctioned forum 
where the parish's leaders, both priestly and lay, could be questioned by the average 
parishioner. Governance within the parish relied on informal procedures, leaving lay 
participation in the parish's governance entirely at the discretion of its priests.71 
 In practice, moreover, the Parish Councils generally coordinated the 
activities of the parish's various lay organizations in implementing the directives of 
the priests, primarily preoccupied with the organization of major events such as the 
parish's Feast Day or carnivals. They held no real decision-making power. If the 
Council disagreed with any decisions made by the priest, he could simply bypass 
them and approach other, more cooperative lay leaders. 72   
 By the 1990s, the Parish Councils were being phased out in favour of Parish 
Pastoral Councils (PPCs) that better fitted what was envisioned in Canon Law and 
Christus Dominus. Instead of being coordinating bodies that directed parish 
organizations to fulfil the wishes of the priests, the PPCs were designed to enable 
priests and laity to collaboratively "ponder and investigate pastoral concerns and to 
formulate practical conclusions concerning them".73 In practical terms this meant 
that the PPCs' role expanded to include the task of drawing up and implementing 
the annual agenda and activities of the parish.  
 This change was prompted by the recommendations of the July 1990 
Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences' (FABC) Fifth Plenary Assembly which 
called for Asian churches to become more participatory and ensure that "the gifts 
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that the Holy Spirit gives to all the faithful -- lay, religious and cleric alike -- are 
recognized and activated.”74  The Archdiocese formally embarked on the 
implementation of the FABC's 1990 recommendation through the Pastoral Vision 
and Planning process launched in August 1997.75 However, by 2000 not all parishes 
had PPCs and the Archbishop, a major supporter of the initiative, was forced to issue 
a reminder of the need for them under Canon Law.76   
 The Church had planned to establish an Archdiocesan Pastoral Council (APC), 
but these plans were shelved in 2001 for two reasons.77 First was the slow progress 
in the creation of PPCs, which was only revitalized in 2004 by the formation of a PPC 
Promotion team,78 which led to the confirmed formation of PPCs in all parishes by 
the end of 2004.79 Second, the development of an APC was set back by the 
resignation of Archbishop Yong in 2001, which meant the loss of the initiative's 
major backer.80 Yong's successor Archbishop Nicholas Chia diverted resources from 
PPC promotion to the RENEW pastoral program.81 
 The revitalized PPC promotion effort of the 2000s finally took steps to 
address the lack of a common constitution governing their operations. In June 2004 
the Archdiocese drafted a Parish Pastoral Councils—Provisional Constitution which 
after consultation and refinement was formally approved by Archbishop Chia in 
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March 2007. It clearly stipulated that PPCs should be established in all parishes and 
given a consultative vote in the affairs of the parish subject to the norms outlined 
therein, including opening membership through direct election at annual Parish 
Assemblies open to all parishioners. The constitution also stipulated that the 
Assemblies were to decide the agenda for the PPC in a particular year, and that the 
PPC was accountable through the delivery of annual reports to the Assembly.82 
Parish priests were now formally obliged to create a forum wherein the laity through 
their representatives in the PPC and directly at the Parish Assembly could present 
their opinions with the expectation that the priest would give these opinions due 
consideration.  
 Thus it was only in 2004 that real progress was made in terms of effective 
lay participation through the implementation of a common Archdiocesan wide 
constitution, though not an APC. It should be noted, however, that the laity seemed 
to expect nothing more significant; my interviewees consistently mentioned that, in 
the eyes of the Church, the fifty years since Vatican II was only a short time and that 
more radical change would take more time. 
Developing its institutions and encouraging lay participation 
 Between 1972 and 2001, the Archdiocese underwent many institutional 
developments with the aim of moving the Catholic Church in Singapore away from 
the legacies of the Colonial Church whilst keeping pace with broader trends in the 
universal Church. Much of this work was made possible through the active work of 
Archbishop Yong. This focus on institutions, I will argue in the next chapter would 
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influence the Archdiocese's decisions when confronted by specific government 
policies in the realm of education.  
[29] 
 
Chapter 3: The Archdiocese of Singapore and Education 
 In addition to the institutional development of the internal aspects of the 
Archdiocese, the local Church also engaged in this process in regards to institutions 
with a greater degree of contact with the non-Catholic public and with the State 
itself, which led to conflict and confrontation. Particularly important were the 
Church's educational institutions. The Roman Catholic Church has had a long 
involvement in education, having founded one of the island's earliest schools, Saint 
Joseph's Institution (SJI) in 1852.83 Such Catholic mission schools, alongside their 
Protestant counterparts, played a central part in providing education in colonial 
Singapore. However, after achieving self-government and eventually full 
independence, Singapore founded a large number of new government schools that 
reduced the significance of the mission schools while pressurising them to conform 
to the national education agenda.84   
 By 1972, the Singaporean government had come to exercise considerable 
control over the thirty six local Catholic schools, with the majority of them reliant on 
government financial aid; only two, Sacred Heart Boys' School and Our Lady of 
Lourdes School, remained privately run and thus financially independent.85 After the 
closure of the latter two schools by 2000, all remaining Catholic schools were 
government aided.86 
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 Financial assistance for schools was governed by the 1957 Education 
Ordinance and later the Education Act of 1982. Aided schools could retain autonomy 
in three areas: Firstly, those run by religious organizations may conduct religious 
instruction but only in addition to government-mandated subjects. Such instruction 
would not be compulsory, and a commitment to attend it would not be a 
prerequisite for admission. Secondly, whilst aided schools had to adhere to the 
government hiring requirements for staff, they retained autonomy in the selection 
of specific individuals subject to approval from the Ministry of Education (MOE). 
Thirdly, the regulations did not impose any restrictions on non-curricular activities 
like masses, spiritual retreats and prayers but required that "[e]very aided school 
shall conform to and maintain standards that are comparable with or similar to 
those of Government schools of the same type in respect of facilities, academic 
matters, school fees, and staff qualifications and salaries." Failure to comply with 
these terms meant that aid-schools would face the prospect of the government 
withholding, reducing or withdrawing entirely its financial support.87  
 Despite government control over the Catholic schools, with their large 
enrolments that included many non-Catholics, remained major sites of contact 
between the Archdiocese and broader Singaporean society and were thus core 
institutions to the local Church. I will demonstrate in this chapter, that when 
confronted with the choice between complying with government policies it 
disagreed with or non-compliance and risk losing government aid, the Archdiocese 
chose the former albeit under protest. This demonstrated a pragmatic prioritization 
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of the survival of Catholic education in Singapore over its principles. This will be 
illustrated through the Archdiocese's responses to the government introduced 
initiatives to provide priority during Primary One admissions for the children of 
parents who had previously undergone sterilization; and the short lived introduction 
of Religious Knowledge (RK) as a compulsory subject between 1982 and 1992. When 
the Archdiocese was faced with government educational policies to which the 
choice of compliance did not affect the vital aid to its schools, it was allowed more 
varied responses. However, even in such cases its pragmatism can be observed, as 
with its responses to the introduction of so-called “independent schools” in 1988.  
Priority for the children of sterilized parents during Primary One registration 
 In the Primary One registration exercise for the 1975 academic year held in 
July-August 1974, the Singapore government introduced for the first time, priority of 
admission to schools for the children of sterilized parents. If a child was a fourth or 
subsequent child in the family, priority admission was given if the parents had 
undergone sterilization and met the other Phase One or Two criteria that offered 
priority to children connected to the school in various ways.88 This measure was part 
of the government's broader family planning efforts to seek zero population 
growth.89  This goal required the lowering of fertility to the replacement rate of two 
children per family.90   
 In 1975, the preferential system was made more controversial when the 
government moved to broaden the scheme by granting outright priority, and top 
                                                          
88
 “Primary One Registration Begins on July 29,” The Straits Times[henceforth ST], July 22, 
1974. 
89
 Chua Sian Chin, “Speech by Mr. Chua Sian Chin, Minister for Health and Home Affairs, at 
the World Population Conference, Bucharest, Romania, 19 - 30 August 1974,” in Singapore 
Public Health Bulletin, vol. No. 15 (Singapore, 1975). 
90
 Saw Swee-Hock, The Population of Singapore, Third (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2012), 174. 
[32] 
 
priority at that, under Phase Two of the admission exercise to all children whose 
parents had undergone sterilisation.91 This meant that Christian schools which had 
previously "jealously guarded their portals through selective admission, now found 
they were facing an invasion by 'outsiders' on the strength of a sterilization 
certificate."92 A large percentage and in some cases the majority of the children with 
connections to such schools were bypassed in favour of the children of sterilized 
parents. These schools had previously used selective admission to help maintain 
their distinctive character, but now were forced to give priority to children of 
sterilized parents instead of those of its patrons and alumni.93 This made it more 
difficult to cultivate inter-generational support for the school and made the 
development of a common character within the student body more difficult as 
schools now had students with a more diverse group of backgrounds, certainly in 
terms of religion and probably in terms of socio-economic status as well.  
 In response the Christian Aided Schools Council, representing thirty 
government-aided mission schools, met with officials from MOE and pressed for a 
"fairer" admission system by recommending that "'that [all] children eligible under 
Phase Two be given places by ballot.'" without regard to sterilization or other criteria 
for priority.94 Whilst the government did not take onboard the Council's suggestion 
it proceeded to revise the criteria for priority to focus on parents who had been 
sterilized at a younger age and before the birth of a third child.95  
 This policy persisted until the admission exercise for the academic year of 
1993 when the entire exercise was streamlined, but with sterilization no longer a 
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factor.96 This revision was prompted by growing concern over Singapore's steadily 
falling birth rate which had by 1977 fallen below the replacement rate of 2.1 births 
per woman and has yet to recover.97  The perpetually low birth rate had by the early 
1990s become a major cause of concern.98 It was only in the mid-1980s that the 
government began to take note of the consequences of the prolonged low level of 
fertility, leading it to drop the promotion of sterilization.99 Nevertheless, the 
government's policy of offering priority to the children of sterilized parents to 
promote sterilization as a part of its population control measures put it in conflict 
with Church doctrine on contraception.100  
 In 1976 the government decided that it would persist in the priority 
admission for sterilization scheme, claiming to have engaged in two years of 
consultations with various stakeholders including the Catholic Church.101 
Subsequently, dissatisfied with the government's 1976 changes, the Archdiocese 
took a harder stand and changed its focus of contention from the "fairness" of the 
admission system to the validity of such a policy on doctrinal grounds. Archbishop 
Olçomendy issued a pastoral letter in March 1976 expressing his disapproval of the 
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priority for sterilization scheme as it did not "conform to the law of God and ... is not 
for the good of our society" and would "hurt the consciences of many in 
Singapore."102 This was accompanied by an Open Letter to the Prime Minister by 
fifteen priests objecting to "sterilization as a means of getting children into 
schools."103 
  Despite these protests, the government was firm in its decision. During the 
parliamentary debate over the MOE's 1976 budget, in direct response to the 
pastoral letter's contents that had been raised by other parliamentarians, Minister 
of State for Education Chai Chong Yii replied that the government had already made 
revisions to the policy after consultations with members of the public including 
representatives from churches. He argued that these consultations showed that "the 
majority of [churches] do not object (if not agree) to this national policy." 
Furthermore, he stated that the government had "no intention to meddle with 
[anyone's] religious beliefs but national policy should take precedence over any 
other policy."104   
 It is worth mentioning that unlike the Catholic Church, the Protestant 
churches as described by the late Methodist Bishop Doraisamy generally saw the 
sterilization issue as something for families to decide on their own and thus did not 
make a stand, though he further clarified that this did not mean they encouraged or 
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recommended sterilization as a form of contraception.105 Thus in these 
circumstances the Church was isolated by having a specifically ‘Catholic’ stance 
rather than a ‘Christian’ position shared with the Protestant churches—probably the 
implication of Chai Chong Yi’s point quoted above. 
 The Catholic schools' position, as summarized in a statement by the local 
heads of six major religious orders, was that they shared the government's concern 
for the need to promote conscientious family planning. However, in accordance with 
Church teachings they did not feel that sterilization was in keeping with the 
responsible parenthood that they sought to inculcate through their moral education 
programs. The priority scheme represented "a serious problem of conscience” 
forcing them to “weigh the contribution” of mission schools to religious and moral 
education against the consequences of following an admissions policy they 
opposed.106  
 Three options on how the schools could proceed were outlined by the 
Diocesan Committee for Justice and Peace (DCJP) in a circular issued to parishioners 
on 3 July 1976. Firstly, they could comply with the government, thus violating the 
spirit of the Archbishop's pastoral letter. Secondly, they could refuse to comply and 
thus risk the withdrawal of government aid and the consequent closure of many 
Catholic schools. This, the Committee argued, would increase the Archdiocese's 
credibility by demonstrating that it was willing to stand up for and pay the price for 
its principles and lead to a "badly-needed re-structuring of the Church in Singapore.". 
Implicit in this call for "re-structuring" was the DCJP's opinion that the Archdiocese 
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insufficiently embodied the ideals of being a Church as embodied in Vatican II, 
including being an activist Church willing to defend its principles. The DCJP thus felt 
that a reorganization of its institutions, such as the inevitable closure of many of its 
schools should government aid be withdrawn, would reduce government influence 
over the local Church, allowing it to more freely stand up for its beliefs. The 
Committee's preference for this option whilst not explicitly stated was clear. Lastly, 
the schools could compromise and implement the government's directive under 
protest, a course of action that the Committee found most likely but less 
desirable.107 The circular was thus an attempt to influence the Archdiocese towards 
a direction that the Committee felt was appropriate but which by its own admission 
was not the leadership's preferred option. 
 Reverend R.P. Balhetchet, however articulated the doctrinal argument 
which provided the Archdiocese with a solution to this dilemma. He argued that the 
issue at stake was not sterilization itself, which he decried, but rather whether 
compliance with government policies would mean that the Archdiocese "implicitly 
condoned the practice of sterilization and as such therefore, giving scandal“ i.e., 
causing offense and/or indirectly promoting what was viewed as the sinful action of 
sterilization. He further contended that scandal "can be obviated in the particular 
case by clarification of the position of the Church and the [Archdiocese]. This would 
amount to 'compliance under protest,' which is commonly accepted as a clarification 
of one's position with a view to obviating any mis-representation of one's action 
which is dictated by other reasons."108  
                                                          
107
 “Catholic Schools Likely to Comply ‘under Protest,’” ST, July 6, 1976. I have been unable to 
acquire a copy of the original circular. . 
108
  Robert P. Balhetchet, “Pr. School Registration in Singapore,” CN, July 18, 1976.  
[37] 
 
 Balhetchet argued that his compliance was not motivated solely by a desire 
to preserve the Church's institutions, as opponents to the option of complying under 
protest were claiming and furthermore that these same opponents were basing 
their objections on unsound grounds. According to him they believed that the 
Catholic school was solely a Church institution to educate Catholic children, not a 
full-fledged public school and that if circumstances required it, religious and moral 
education taught at Catholic schools could be replaced by classes in the home or at 
parish level. Based on these beliefs some, he implied including the DCJP, were 
advocating the closing of Catholic schools as a means to embarrass the State, as the 
Church could propagate religious and moral education through alternative channels 
while Singapore had many other options for academic education. 109  
 Balhetchet however pointed out that such thinking was labelled as 
"'erroneous'" in the 1972 The Catholic School in the Pluralistic Society issued by the 
Vatican. He then proceeded to argue that Church teaching sees Catholic schools as 
vital parts of its training and spiritual formation for Christian and non-Christian 
students alike. In other words, it was better for Catholic schools to make 
compromises and comply under protest than not to have them at all. 110 
 Ultimately, the Archdiocese and the Catholic schools chose not to pursue 
the matter further after receiving an assurance from the government that non-
Catholics would handle the actual registration process so that Catholics would not 
be forced to engage in something contrary to their beliefs and in the belief that the 
priority for sterilization scheme was merely a passing phase.111 This decision was a 
pragmatic one that served to ensure the survival of Catholic education even at the 
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expense of adherence to Church doctrine. Whilst Balhetchet attempts to provide 
justification for compliance under protest, his lengthy piece serves more as an 
apologetic that disputed one set of justifications and replaced them with another set 
of more doctrinally sound ones . Not once did he seriously weigh the potential 
positive outcome of non-compliance, instead focusing on elements of opposing 
arguments that he could readily call into question, thus in effect setting up a straw 
man argument. Nevertheless, his response provided a doctrinal basis to justify a 
course of action that the Archdiocese had already chosen. Despite their protests 
against the policy, principals from Catholic schools had from 1975 complied with it, 
and despite moral concerns over continued adherence the religious orders in 1976 
did not choose to exercise their right to withdraw from the schools and hand them 
over to the government.112 The schools were pursuing a pragmatic solution that 
allowed them to protest against what the Church saw as a morally unacceptable 
practice whilst continuing to receive the government aid vital to their operations. 
Their compliance initiated a constant tension between Church principles and State 
initiatives that lasted until the repeal of the priority policy in 1993. 
The short lived introduction of a compulsory Religious Knowledge subject 
 This tension would flare-up once again in response to another government 
education initiative: the decision in 1982 to introduce Religious Knowledge (RK) as a 
compulsory subject. This decision can be traced back to the 1979 Report on Moral 
Education presented by the Moral Education Committee chaired by Ong Teng 
Cheong. The Ong Report as it was also known had examined the moral education 
programs in Singapore schools particularly the Civics and Education for Living 
programs, and found them "inadequate and ineffective"; it recommended that they 
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be "scrapped and replaced". The Ong Report also noted that since these programs 
were non-examinable subjects not all teachers and students took moral education 
seriously; and that religious studies served to support moral education.113   
 In response to the Ong Report, the government allowed a brief period of 
experimentation to work towards a new moral education program.  In 1979 MOE 
approved the inclusion of Bible Knowledge and Islamic RK as examination subjects 
for the secondary school termination examinations.114  At the same time however, 
the government also sought to explore other possible options. One was the "Being 
and Becoming" moral education program drafted by Balhetchet at the government’s 
behest and launched as a pilot program in 1981.115 This new MOE program despite 
being spearheaded by a priest was purely secular in its orientation and framed moral 
justification and behaviour as being driven by the common good of society. It taught 
students morally correct behaviour within a series of "widening circles of 
relationships from self, family, school, neighbourhood, nation to the world."116 
A third option explored by the government was the "Good Citizen" program, 
effectively a revamped version of the existing Education for Living.117 Yet another 
option that emerged in this period was a program by the Christian Schools' Council, 
a body representing the principals of Protestant mission schools, launched in July 
1981 and tested in four schools, which drew on Biblical stories to engender virtues 
such as honesty and loyalty. This program was in response to the Council's belief 
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that a successful moral education program required a religious dimension that other 
programs lacked.118  
A 1981 survey conducted by the teachers' training college, the Institute of 
Education, identified at least six distinct moral education programs, creating an 
impression of “proliferation and even confusion."119 This situation was one "push" 
factor behind the government's decision to introduce RK as a compulsory subject.120 
A further " push" factor was the state's fears of a moral decline in Singapore as 
expressed by First Deputy Prime Minister and Education Minister, Dr. Goh Keng 
Swee, in 1982 where he feared that  the country was becoming a "'nation of 
thieves.'" The government believed that a secular moral education would not be 
enough to rectify the situation as evidenced by the experiences of Western 
countries that had implemented such programs with little success. 121  
 The decision that RK would be made a compulsory subject was announced 
at an MOE Schools Council122 meeting in January 1982 with plans to pilot the 
initiative in Mission Schools immediately using the pre-existing infrastructure from 
teaching Bible Knowledge.123 RK would be taught in all secondary schools from 1984 
from Secondary Three onwards; there were six options—Bible Knowledge, Islamic 
Religious Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Confucian Ethics, Hindu Studies and Sikh 
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Studies. The subject could be offered as an elective subject at 'O' level 
examinations.124 
 The government's plans were not without opposition. At the very Schools 
Council meeting where the decision was announced there were expressions of 
concerns by several principals. Marie Bong , the principal of Katong Convent School, 
shared that when Bible Knowledge had first become a compulsory subject, there 
had been a immediate negative reaction from parents of students from other 
religions; she was concerned about a similar reaction to the RK scheme. In reply, Dr 
Goh emphasized the variety of choices available under RK. Principals from secular 
schools were the next to raise their concerns, R. Subramaniam, principal of Outram 
Secondary, feared that teachers would use such classes to engage in evangelization, 
whilst Chia Meng Ann, from Ahmad Ibrahim Secondary in turn raised the possibility 
of religious cliques within the school that might lead to clashes. The Minister 
responded by saying it was up to the school principals to manage things so it did not 
deteriorate to this extent. 125 
  Objections were also raised by Brother Joseph McNally, principal of St. 
Patrick's School, who felt that secondary school students were too immature for this 
subject. He argued that the teaching of four different religions—whether as single 
subjects or together as part of the same subject, the two options envisioned for RK 
at this stage—would confuse them due to conflicting beliefs and taboos; and that 
students without their own religion might become agnostic, leading to the creation 
of a totally agnostic population in the future. Dr Goh replied that he agreed that it 
might be too confusing but he felt that most Singaporeans were already agnostic 
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even if they said otherwise in censuses, so there was no cause for concern on that 
front. The Minister of State (Education) Dr Tan Eng Soon further reassured the 
principals that no teachers from unorthodox sects would be allowed to use RK 
classes to spread their teachings. (Interestingly, there is no mention of objections 
from principals of Protestant mission schools). Dr. Goh acknowledged the challenges 
but felt that bold measures were needed to address the serious problem of 
Singapore's moral decline.126  
 Balhetchet, perhaps partly in defence of MOE's Being and Becoming moral 
education program of which he was now project director, argued in a January 1987 
report to the Schools Council that moral education combined with religion was 
preferable to religious knowledge alone to produce more moral students. RK as a 
subject could only improve students' behaviour and attitudes through actual 
conversion. Since this was not MOE’s objective, its aims for RK were therefore "self-
defeating or contradictory"127  
  Balhetchet likewise felt that studying a single religion as a subject would 
teach students about it but not lead to changes in their behaviour, whilst studying 
religions comparatively focuses more on issues of dogma rather than morality. 
Moral education in contrast, argued Balhetchet, has the specific aim of getting 
"students to change their attitudes and behaviour in accordance with a set of values 
considered desirable by a society." He concluded that moral education 
complemented by religion would be further enhanced as it would add an element of 
faith that would help moral behaviour.128 









 On 7 February 1982, Catholic News published an editorial on the issue 
summarizing the objections raised by the principals at the Schools Council meeting 
and Balhetchet's views. It endorsed the latter, thereby making them the 
Archdiocese's official position. The Catholic paper however went a step further and 
criticized the government's overly utilitarian approach to the issue. It accused the 
government of reducing religion to a means to an end, namely inculcating moral 
values in future generations. It argued that this would have the effect of "alienating 
our youth from the value of religion" and instead urged all those involved with 
Singaporean youth to find other ways to fight moral decline.129  
 Opposition to the scheme was also voiced by the Chairperson of the 
Singapore Catholic Schools' Council (CSC), Margaret Mary Joseph. Whilst she agreed 
with Balhetchet that compulsory religious knowledge was not an ideal substitute to 
moral education; her biggest concern was with it being compulsory, since it would 
increase the number of subjects from a minimum of five and a maximum of eight to 
a range of six to nine subjects.130 However, Joseph also acknowledged the futility in 
seeking to change the government's decision when even someone of Balhetchet's 
standing could not influence the decision. She noted that "the best form of moral 
education is by example and by total immersion in a moral environment supported 
by formal lessons." As such the CSC would be intensifying its training of teachers and 
principals using resources from SPI and overseas in a bid to better assist both the 
cultivation of a holistic moral atmosphere in the schools and the effectiveness of 
formal RK lessons..131  
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Thus despite strong opposition, the Archdiocese chose not to pursue the 
matter beyond voicing its objection and instead complied with the government’s 
decision and even helped it along by piloting the initiative in the Catholic schools. It 
should be noted that the Archdiocese's stand on RK would at first glance seem to 
contradict earlier calls for more time devoted to religious instruction, as articulated 
in 1977 at a seminar it organized on moral education in Catholic schools as a means 
to strengthen their Catholic character.132 However, the Archdiocese's specific 
opposition to RK was based on its use as a direct substitute for moral education, on 
the grounds that religious instruction was being used ineffectively and therefore 
inappropriately. 
 The Archdiocese's position on the matter would make an about-face seven 
years later when the government reversed its own stand on the issue of RK as a 
compulsory subject. In October 1989 Minister of Education Tony Tan Keng Yam, 
announced in Parliament that in the wake of a government review and a series of 
consultations with various stakeholders, RK as a compulsory subject would be 
replaced by a civics and moral education program by 1992, thus largely returning to 
the status quo ante. RK subjects would continue to be available on an optional basis 
with classes taught outside of curriculum time and would furthermore remain 
examinable at the 'O' levels, though after five years they could no longer be used for 
pre-university admission requirements. Dr. Tan justified this abrupt decision by 
citing the "heightened consciousness of religious differences and a new fervour in 
the propagation of religious beliefs" in recent years. In this changed climate, he 
argued that the Singapore government must remain neutral in religious matters and 
must not give the appearance even unintentionally of favouring any particular 
                                                          
132
 Catholic Schools’ Council and Catholic Teacher’s Movement, “Final Report of the Seminar 
on Moral Education in Catholic Schools” December 1977. 
[45] 
 
religion. Schools as government supported institutions should not be used as a 
vehicle to transmit religious belief; this should be done by parents and religious 
institutions.133 This represented a shift by the government from attempting to 
maintain its neutrality via a multi-religious approach to a purely secular one. 
 RK itself was not a direct source of religious tension but fell victim to the 
changed climate cited by Dr Tan; the government's broader concerns over religious 
tensions in the late 1980s and early 1990s changed in the wake of the 1987 'Marxist 
Conspiracy', as will be discussed in the next chapter. This was made clear during the 
course of the 6 October 1989 parliamentary debate on the abolition of compulsory 
RK where it was repeatedly emphasized that this decision was in line with keeping 
politics and religion separate (their mixing having been a key government accusation 
of what had happened in 1987). This link can also be observed through the 
affirmative response by the Minister for Law and Home Affairs, S. Jayakumar, to 
MP’s’ calls for “ground rules” to ensure the separation of politics and religion.134 
These rules would take the form of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and 
would be preceded in 1989 with a White Paper outlining the reasons for new 
legislation to maintain religious harmony. In the White Paper the State concluded 
that religious harmony in Singapore was fragile. It specifically highlighted twelve 
incidents of special concern; three of them were directly or indirectly linked to the 
'Conspiracy' and the accusation that the Church was getting involved in politics.135 It 
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should be noted however that no concerns were raised in relation to the mission 
schools themselves. 
 The Archdiocese's response to the decision to withdraw RK as a compulsory 
subject was characterized by two factors. Firstly, by 1989 the Archdiocese had 
changed its opinion on the issue and expressed its preference to retain RK a 
compulsory subject. This can be observed in Archbishop Yong's talk during the 
Teachers Day Mass in August 1989, some time before the decision to formally 
withdraw the subject was announced but when it was already under review. Yong 
stated that "to deprive our students of Religious Knowledge is to deprive them of 
the most important component for living a meaningful and purposeful life in time 
and eternity. Education should prepare a person to live not only on this side of the 
grave but also on the other side."136  
 Secondly, the 'Marxist Conspiracy' affected the Archdiocese's response to 
the government's decision. The 1987 confrontation between the Archdiocese and 
the State and the former's capitulation in the face of government pressure led it to 
become more cautious in handling tense Church-State relations. This can be 
observed in the milder tone taken by the Archdiocese in response to the 1989 
government decision in contrast to its more critical stance back in 1982, even 
though logically one would expect its opposition to have been stronger in 1989. 
Archbishop Yong in his August 1989 talk expressed his preference for RK to remain 
compulsory but recognized that the decision was ultimately with the MOE and there 
was a good chance of its abolition. He then proceeded to urge that regardless of 
whether RK remained compulsory, its teachers, whether in schools, parishes or at 
home, should give it the priority religious instruction requires. He thus signalled the 
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Archdiocese's acceptance of the government's decision on the matter regardless of 
the outcome. He never criticised the MOE and in fact instead lauded it for working 
towards providing Singaporean students the best education possible and instead 
phrased his preference as advice for it to consider in its efforts.137  This milder tone 
was also expressed by CN , which did not criticize the government's decision but 
focused instead on how parents and parishes would now have to take up the 
slack.138 By contrast, in 1982 CN had denounced the government's introduction of RK 
as a devaluation of religion. 
 Overall, despite opposition to the government's decisions about its 
experiment with RK as a compulsory subject, particularly its introduction as a 
compulsory subject and the preference for its maintenance in 1989, the Archdiocese 
nonetheless complied with the government's decision in both instances. This choice 
to limit its opposition to compliance under protest was because to do otherwise 
would be to refuse to follow national policy on curriculum which would be grounds 
for withdrawal of the government aid that the majority of Catholic schools were 
reliant upon and force them to close.139  
The introduction of independent schools 
 The Archdiocese further illustrated its pragmatism in the sphere of 
education in its response to the government's initiative in 1986 to introduce 
independent schools. As with the RK experiment the independent schools initiative 
constituted one episode in the occasionally tense Church-State relationship 
following the Archdiocese's compliance in 1975 to the State's priority admissions 
scheme. The Archdiocese's response to this initiative, like its reaction to the end of 
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the RK experiment, was also greatly shaped by the 'Marxist Conspiracy' that was 
playing out at the same time that the initiative's merits was being debated. 
 This initiative was set in motion at a Schools Council meeting on 8 October 
1986 when Eugene Wijeysingha, principal of Raffles Institution (RI) submitted a 
paper proposing that RI become independent.140  The specifics were outlined by the 
Minister of Education Dr Tan in June 1987 and expanded upon in parliament in 
August 1987. According to Dr Tan the independent schools would be given greater 
autonomy in terms of staffing, salaries, finance, management and curriculum so as 
to develop practices and programs that if beneficial could "be spread throughout 
our whole education system."141 Financial autonomy extended to student fees as 
well with SJI, Anglo-Chinese School and Chinese High School having made plans to 
increase their fees after they go independent in 1988. Despite this greater autonomy 
however independent schools were still expected to continue to conform to national 
educational policies.142   
 The introduction of independent schools was in line with government 
thinking as first expressed by First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1985, 
who said that the MOE should loosen its control over the schools and give them 
more autonomy to innovate by giving them "the right to appoint staff on their own 
terms, devise their own curricula, and chose their own textbooks."143 Goh in 1985 
had thus already outlined much of what the government would put into practice. 
Considering the government's own leanings towards the granting of greater 
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autonomy to premier schools it was no surprise that Wijeysingha's proposal was 
received warmly and described by Dr Tan as "'the best submission [he'd] received 
from a principal in a long, long while.'"144 
 By June 1987 in a bid by the government to allay concerns expressed by 
stakeholders and to provide clarification, the government outlined that the greater 
autonomy schools would be granted by going independent would involve giving 
such schools total control over staff management and school operations; greater 
freedom in curriculum policy so long as mandatory policies, such as bilingualism, 
were retained; and control over expulsions. To keep fees at such schools affordable 
and to incentivize going independent to cash strapped schools, the government 
offered a subsidy of $2,500 per student and further guaranteed financial aid to 
poorer students unable to meet the schools' fees.145 
 On 4 November 1986, in a special meeting with Dr Tan ten top schools were 
approached with the prospect of going independent. This included four Catholic 
schools: St. Nicholas Girls' School, the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus (CHIJ) (Toa 
Payoh), SJI and St. Michael's School.146In response to this invitation, various Catholic 
organizations voiced their opinions on the issue. The initial response by the 
principals of Catholic schools was a desire for clarifications about issues which were 
only clarified subsequently: the scope of the proposed autonomy; financing for such 
schools; and their fears that higher fees would put independent schools out of reach 
of the poor and at odds with the Christian mission of outreach to the less 
fortunate.147 The fear that going independent would mean fewer government 
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subsidies was not limited to Catholics but shared by the wider Singaporean public as 
well.148 
  In March 1987 the Archdiocese responded to the independent school 
proposal through its Catholic Education Commission which met to compile the views 
from its members into a single report submitted that month.149 The Catholic 
Teachers' Movement (CTM) organized a forum in January 1987 at Catholic Junior 
College where the consensus emerged that there was no outright objections to the 
idea of independent schools but that there were concerns about cost; fears over 
how their introduction would affect the availability of places for less academically 
successful students; unease over the increased pressure and the possibility of elitism 
among students; and finally worries over the morale of teachers not selected to 
teach in such schools.150  
 The CTM subsequently proceeded to present the MOE a paper calling for all 
schools in Singapore to be made independent, as it felt that singling out some 
schools would only serve to lead to a greater gulf between those which went 
independent and other schools.151 This call was echoed by the Christian Family and 
Social Movement, a lay Catholic organization responsible for the promotion of good 
Christian families.152 The proposal to make all schools independent was from the 
onset unlikely to gain traction, something the Catholic organizations must have been 
aware of. It was thus less an attempt to sway the government's opinion but rather a 
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critique of the fundamentally elitist nature of the plan for only elite schools to go 
independent.  Dr Tan however rejected this proposal and defended the 
government’s position on the grounds that only the best schools had the potential 
and supporting structures in order to even try going independent.153  
 Ultimately, however, the Archdiocese left the decision to the full discretion 
of two religious orders—the Congregation of the Holy Infant Jesus, or Infant Jesus (IJ) 
sisters and the Brothers of the Christian Schools, otherwise known as the Lasallian 
brothers—which between them ran all four of the mission schools being proposed 
for independence. However, by not implementing a common response to the 
independent school proposal, the Archdiocese was in effect shifting responsibility 
over the decisions to the individual Orders. Whilst it may be said that the 
Archdiocese was not entitled to make the decision on behalf of the Orders, it was 
certainly entitled to at least express an preference on the matter, that it did not do 
so suggests it was attempting to pass off responsibility on the issue in order to avoid 
offending the State and further aggravating already tense Church-State relations. 
 Even before the government clarifications discussed above, the IJ sisters 
promptly rejected the independence option. They chose to do so as they wanted to 
stand by their order’s commitment to providing education to the needy without 
regard to intellectual ability. The sisters feared that "independent schools will only 
cater to an elite group of students with outstanding intellectual capabilities and the 
money to pay for high entrance fees." —a position they maintained even when the 
government clarified that independent schools would still receive aid.154 Such 
concerns over the elitist quality of independent schools proved true as noted by 
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Jason Tan who observed that the scheme aggravates the differences between 
educational outcomes both between schools and between students from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds.155  
 In contrast, the Lasallian brothers of SJI were more welcoming to the 
government's invitation, especially once assured of continued financial assistance, 
notably when the government offered to provide SJI with eighty percent of its 
capital development costs. Financial concerns allayed the brothers were excited by 
the prospects going independent offered as it would allow the school to emphasis 
character development through the cultivation of the Christian spirit in a Christian 
environment, thereby allowing it to fulfil their mission of serving the spiritually 
poor.156 SJI thus enthusiastically began its operations as the first and only 
independent Catholic school on 4 January 1988.157 The remarkably different 
responses to the independent school initiative between the two Orders stem from a 
difference in priorities. Whilst the sisters prioritized staying true to their founder's 
commitment to providing education to all, the brothers prioritized the provision of 
the best education possible. 
 The Archdiocese's response to the independent schools proposal should be 
seen in the context of two factors. Firstly, the proposal was markedly different from 
the government initiatives already examined in this chapter. Unlike the sterilization 
or RK issues, failure to comply with the government's invitation to go independent 
would not jeopardize government aid.  
 Second, the 'Marxist Conspiracy' was unfolding even as the proposal was 
being discussed with the first round of arrests by the Internal Security Department 
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(ISD) taking place on 21 May 1987.158 The Archdiocese was thus unwilling to make a 
bigger issue of its protest against the elitist quality of the independent schools 
proposal, as the Church was already faced with heightened tension in Church-State 
relations. Given the varied responses allowed by the case-by-case nature of the 
proposal, it chose not to impose its opinion on the Catholic schools and instead 
allowed the managing religious orders to make the choice on their own. Moreover, 
going independent however would mean recognition as an elite school, and thus a 
boost to the overall prestige of the Catholic school system, an allure that the 
Archdiocese was hard pressed to resist.  
The Archdiocese's pragmatic approach to the sphere of education 
 An assessment of the Archdiocese's engagement within the realm of 
education shows that there existed a constant state of tension with the State as the 
Church's principles clashed with the government's initiatives. This coupled with 
heightened tensions caused by events outside the realm of education such as the 
'Marxist Conspiracy' served to engender within the Archdiocese an unwillingness to 
act against the wishes of the Singapore government for fear of exacerbating these 
tensions and causing them to boil over. In all the cases examined above whenever 
the government put forward a proposal, the Archdiocese never tried to act against it. 
This unwillingness to get into conflict with the Singapore government, even when 
doctrine was concerned, was I argue, a result of the decision to prioritize 
pragmatism over principles, with the aim of at least ensuring the survival of the 
Catholic education system, a core Church institution, or at best strengthening it. 
When faced with the choice between standing up for what it believed in and 
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jeopardizing vital government aid, as in the case of the sterilization priority and RK 
issues, the Archdiocese chose to comply albeit under protest.  
 When faced with issues such as the introduction of independent schools 
where the threat of a withdrawal of funding was not a concern, the Archdiocese 
again acted pragmatically. Despite concerns about the elitist nature of the initiative, 
it capitalized on the scope for a variable response to allow SJI alone to go 
independent. This response served three practical purposes: First, it allowed SJI to 
serve as a test bed for the initiative. A test that as Jason Tan's research 
demonstrates only served to confirm the fears of the elitist nature of the policy,159 
which is why no other Catholic school has followed SJI in going independent. Second, 
despite ultimately legitimized concerns about elitism, going independent 
strengthened the Catholic school system by adding an elite institution to its ranks. 
Third, outrightly rejecting the government initiative would have been unwise when 
Church-State tensions were high due to the 'Conspiracy'; allowing at least SJI to go 
independent was a pragmatic compromise with the State.  
 In the realm of education examined in this chapter, the Archdiocese was 
acting in accordance with the need to defend the survival of a set of its core 
institutions, its schools, as such its pragmatism here required it to prevent the 
closure of those institutions (due to a loss of government assistance) even at the 
cost of its principles. This pragmatic approach to dealing with relations with the 
government can also be observed in the Church’s responses to the 1987 "Marxist 
Conspiracy" which I will cover in the next chapter. However, I will argue in this 
instance the confrontation was centred around its peripheral institutions and as a 
result led to a different outcome for the affected organizations.  
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Chapter 4: The 'Marxist Conspiracy' 
 On 21 May 1987, sixteen social activists were arrested by the ISD as part of 
Operation Spectrum in what was described in The Straits Times (ST), as 
"investigations into a clandestine communist network.”160 This was the start of a 
confrontation between the Archdiocese and the government that would become 
known as the 'Marxist Conspiracy' where the State alleged that a number of the 
Archdiocese's organizations had been infiltrated by pro-Communists who were using 
them to radicalize Singaporeans in a bid to topple the government.161 This 
confrontation saw the simmering tensions between the Church and State grow to 
levels far above those generated by the disagreements over education policies 
examined in the previous chapter.  
In this chapter, I will focus on the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) and 
the Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers (CCFW), both of which are peripheral 
institutions of the Archdiocese and how this meant the Church was willing, in stark 
contrast to its behavior as outlined in the previous chapter when its core schools 
were threatened, to seemingly counterintuitively shut them down to avoid 
heightened conflict with the State. I will also examine controversial content 
emerging in the Archdiocesan paper, Catholic News, which contributed to the clash. 
I will argue that the Archdiocese's decision to succumb to government pressure and 
side with the latter's version of the 'Marxist Conspiracy' despite initial resistance to 
doing so was influenced by the same desire to avoid a broader confrontation with 
the State and thus preserve its core institutions. 
Vatican II and the Archdiocese's social activism 
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 The confrontation's roots lie in the Archdiocese's attempts at engaging in 
social activism as spelled out in the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Catholic social 
activism can be traced back hundreds of years but first began to be crystallized into 
a coherent doctrine through Pope Leo XII 's 1891 encyclical on capital and labour, 
Rerum Novarum.162 The Church's contemporary social activism however is best 
outlined in Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 
Gaudium et Spes, promulgated by Pope Paul VI on 7 December 1965. The document 
outlined that whilst the Church has a mission to save souls, it is also an earthly 
institution and should be concerned with the present, especially the lives of the 
needy.163 
 Gaudium et Spes highlighted five urgent areas of social, political and 
economic issues. First, it identified that the institutions of marriage and the family 
were under threat from "serious disturbances ... caused in families by modern 
economic conditions, by influences at once social and psychological and by the 
demands of civil society." Secondly, it felt that there was an urgent need amongst 
Christians and the Church to foster economic and political decisions at both the 
national and international level to engender the formation of a universal culture that 
respected "the dignity of the human person without any discrimination." Thirdly, it 
acknowledged the vast inequalities between the rich and the poor in the economic 
realm. Fourth, the Church though separate from the political community must act as 
"a safeguard of the transcendent character of the human person" by ensuring that 
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political authorities exercise their power morally, for the common good, and in 
accordance with legitimately established law. Lastly, it encouraged Christians to 
organize and foster the creation of international bodies to secure "a peace based on 
justice and love."164  
 Gaudium et Spes also called for the universal Church to form a new 
organization "to stimulate the Catholic community to promote progress in needy 
regions and international social justice."165 In response Paul VI formed the Pontifical 
Commission for Justice and Peace in January 1967.166 Local dioceses worldwide also 
formed their own JPCs, such as the JPC of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese in 1977; 
and the creation of the National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice and Peace in 
the Philippines in 1966.167 
 The Archdiocese of Singapore formed its own JPC in 1978 to implement the 
agenda of Gaudium et Spes. The Commission sought to make Singapore's Catholics 
aware that they had a duty to play a part in promoting justice in society through 
action and proclaiming the lapses in these fields. The JPC studied the social teaching 
of the Church as well as the Singaporean context to teach local Catholics how the 
Church's teaching can be applied to all levels of local society. It also identified 
specific cases "where justice or human rights would appear to be violated or poverty 
perpetrated", collected all relevant information, and if necessary issued public 
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declarations of its findings. 168  The JPC produced, for example, a 1979 paper that 
called for better moral education in response to the rising crime rate; and a 
December 1983 report (jointly published with the Young Christian Workers' 
Movement (YCW) and the Christian Family Social Movement) that called for an end 
to twelve-hour shifts which it argued placed profit over the rights and well-being of 
workers.169  The new Commission took on much of the same role as the DCJP whose 
assessment of the Archdiocese's potential responses to the Primary One admission 
issue was discussed in the previous chapter; however I have been unable to identify 
any definitive continuity between the two bodies.   
 In practical terms the Commission organized various activities to educate 
Catholics about their faith and the promotion of social justice.  The major thrust of 
the JPC's educative effort took the form of its publications such as its monthly 
Singapore Highlights started in July 1984 and which by June 1987 had a circulation 
of two hundred copies, where the Commission presented a monthly summary of 
current affairs in Singapore to keep Catholics informed and better able to impact 
their society. The Commission also produced dossiers on topical issues, such as a 
reflection on Pope John Paul II's 1986 message to the Church in commemoration of 
the United Nations' 1986 International Year of Peace.170  
 The Commission was also involved in providing coordination between lay 
organizations, notably through the Coalition of Organizations for Religion and 
Development (CORD) which the Commission helped set up in 1985. Its purpose was 
to promote mutual fellowship among different Catholic lay organizations and to 
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bring them together to discuss common issues and to identify areas of potential 
cooperation.171 
 The establishment of the JPC in Singapore paralleled efforts by Churches in 
other countries to respond to Gaudium et Spes. These responses often took a 
distinctively activist tone. Philippines dioceses, for example, provided legal aid to the 
disadvantaged to fight for their rights in the court of law. These legal aid offices 
offered paralegal training to the disadvantaged in their dioceses and also provided 
legal representation for the poor when necessary.172 In Singapore, the Archdiocese’s 
response was less overtly confrontational, but it offered similar assistance to the 
disadvantaged, particularly foreign workers. The CCFW, originally started in 1980 by 
several parishes, was intended to reach out and foster communication between 
middle-class Catholics and other sectors of the population, particularly the young 
Malaysian migrant workers housed in the hostels located around the Geylang area 
where the centre was located. The Centre provided the workers a place for 
recreational and educational activities and for non-Christians and Christians to pray 
together outside of the traditional framework of Church worship.173 It also offered 
classes on English, music and Singapore labour laws though by mid 1984 these were 
scaled back to a single English night class due to a lack of volunteers.174  
 Over time, the Centre also became a "a refuge for domestic workers" that 
provided them with counselling, legal aid, and information on immigration and 
labour procedures and by 1987 was receiving twenty calls from maids a day seeking 
assistance on such matters. It functioned as a community centre for these maids 
with a chapel where a special mass was held every Sunday, a large meeting hall, a 
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lounge, a kitchen and a dormitory. It also served as a shelter for runaway maids. In 
the latter cases, the Centre would normally inform the relevant authorities and 
house and support the runaways whilst their cases were being settled by these 
authorities or by civil suit. In such cases the Centre cooperated with the government 
and never questioned its arbitration.175 
 Despite being cornerstones to the Archdiocese's social activism, the JPC and 
the CCFW were both comparatively peripheral institutions. (By contrast, the 
Church's core outreach bodies such as its schools where the enrollment in a single 
school can be up to a thousand or more allowed it to engage with society on a much 
broader scale.) Their reach in Singaporean society was minimal at best as 
demonstrated by the small circulation of the JPC's Singapore Highlights and the fact 
that CCFW was catering to a small population of migrant workers. Yet their more 
explicitly activist role made them a target of governmental suspicion, particularly in 
combination with social and political criticisms articulated in CN. 
 CN represented the most consistent and most public Catholic criticism of the 
Singaporean status quo in a bid to exhort change. This critique was best presented 
by the paper's "Just Living" column that ran from July 1983 till August 1986 when it 
came to an end with the death of its pseudonymous contributor Justus on 28 July.176 
In his column Justus regularly criticized Singaporean society for being unjust as 
exemplified by his 3 Aug 1985 article where he described Singapore  as "becoming a 
society where only the 'strong' (the productive, more educated and rich) count, 
while (the lowly paid, less educated and handicapped) are seen as unproductive 








liabilities to our rapid economic success."177 Justus also consistently decried 
Singaporean society as being dehumanizing; he identified the conceptualization of 
labour not as people but as mere factors for wealth production alongside the ever 
increasing pressure in the workplace and school and rising consumerism as being 
potential threats to the nation's peace.178 "Just Living" also denounced Singapore for 
being a restrictive society, accusing the State of using laws and policing to curtail the 
human rights of free expression and organization.179  
 Two particular segments of the Singaporean labour force were seen by 
Justus as being especially vulnerable: firstly, foreign maids whom he described as 
being "hemmed in by restrictive rules … which definitely work in favour of 
employers and against the maid."180 Secondly, those retrenched during the mid-
1980s recession which he argued were given insufficient protection against 
retrenchment nor adequate compensation if retrenchment was unavoidable.181 As a 
whole, Justus' "Just Living" column thus served to highlight the failings of 
Singaporean society. 
  Justus also encouraged CN readers to take on the task as outlined in 
Gaudium et Spes of striving towards a more just society.  In a July 1985 article after 
criticizing Singapore for putting the material rights of food, shelter and clothing over 
civil rights such as free expression and organization, he called for action to rectify 
this injustice arguing that "[a]nalysis itself is insufficient without action." 182 In 
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September 1985 he exhorted Christians to do what he sees as their Christian duty to 
help the poor, who were being neglected by Singaporean society.183  
 CN's critique was not limited to the "Just Living" column, as can be seen in 
the series of critical articles regarding the twelve-hour shift between December 
1983 and May 1984; and a similar series of articles between August and November 
1984 critiquing the government's 1984 amendments to the Employment Act.184 CN's 
critique also continued after Justus’s death; in a 22 February 1987 special on the 
homeless it criticized the government's view that the problem of vagrancy was 
"'contained'" and that many of the remaining vagrants chose to be homeless 
"because it is easier to beg than it is to work." 185 Citing sociologist John Clammer, 
the article attacks the government's position by arguing that it needs to look more 
deeply into the causes of homelessness and the poverty that causes it.186 The paper 
furthermore published extensive and supportive coverage of the Filipino Church's 
activism.187  
 The above examples of the Archdiocese's social activism include both 
advocacy and service to the needy, all of which became sources of displeasure to the 
government. The work of the JPC and CN directly criticized its policies and the 
Singaporean social milieu that it had constructed. The CCFW was a source of State 
displeasure not because of explicit criticisms but via association. As Justus had 
identified foreign maids as being an especially vulnerable segment of the 
Singaporean labour force, CCFW, by virtue of being the Church's response centre to 
their needs, was branded as being implicitly involved in his criticisms. The 
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government's unease at these modest attempts at activism would lead it to put an 
end to them via Operation Spectrum. 
The 'Marxist Conspiracy': timeline188 
 The 'Conspiracy' can be traced back to the mid 1980s, when CN’s 
provocative articles became a cause of concern for the Special Branch which 
observed political matters in the country. In July 1986 the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs met with Archbishop Yong to ask him to stop what the 
government saw as Church publications involving themselves in politics. 189 The 
provocative articles however did not abate and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew felt 
obliged to raise the issue with Pope John Paul II when he visited the island in 
November. According to one account, Lee told the Pope that 
 "the Catholic Church has done good work in Singapore and we want it to 
continue to do work. ... But, Your Holiness, there are some strange goings-
on in the Church now. Some para-Church workers and some priests are 
conducting themselves and acting as if I was President Marcos, and the 
government of Singapore has to be worked against, undermined and 
knocked down."190  
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The government's warnings were however not heeded and thus on 21 May 1987 the 
ISD launched Operation Spectrum and detained sixteen social activists.191 
 Singapore's leading newspaper ST broke the news of the arrests after a brief 
statement from the Ministry of Home Affairs that the arrests were part of 
investigations into a covert communist network and listing the sixteen arrested with 
the promise that more details would be provided soon.192 All those detained were 
held under the Internal Security Act (ISA) which allows for detention without trial.193 
On 20 June the ISD arrested six more people, for a total of twenty two.  
Simultaneously it released four of those detained on 21 May with restrictions placed 
on their ability to travel overseas and to associate and/or participate in 
organizations as dictated by the ISD.194   
 The Singapore government proceeded to use the island's mainstream media 
to convey its version of events through extensive newspaper coverage and the 
televised 'confessions' of Vincent Cheng, the executive secretary of the JPC;195 and of 
lawyer and prominent member of the Law Society Tang Fong Har; founding member 
of the drama group Third Stage and Workers' Party volunteer Chew Kheng Chuan; 
and Singapore Polytechnic lecturer and Third Stage scriptwriter Chng Suan Tse.196 A 
two part documentary on the detentions, "Tracing the Conspiracy", aired on 
television in June that used a collection of statements obtained from the detainees 
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to craft a narrative of the alleged 'conspiracy'.197 Together these media releases 
portrayed the detainees as part of a "Marxist Conspiracy" masterminded by former 
student activist Tan Wah Piow, in exile in the United Kingdom since 1976, to 
establish a network to prepare for his eventual return, after Lee had stepped down 
as Prime Minister and to assist him in establishing a Marxist State in Singapore. 
Vincent Cheng was identified as his “key helper” in Singapore, who having been 
unable to penetrate labour organizations was inspired by the politically active 
Church in the Philippines, to work through Catholic student groups. Other 
'conspirators' allegedly infiltrated the Workers' Party. Tan and Cheng were also 
accused of having set up the Third Stage in 1983 as a ‘front’ organization to 
radicalize the public.198 
 The conspirators were said to have used the organizations they had 
infiltrated “as a cover for their subversive activities … [by hiding] their ideological 
inclinations from other members … and held themselves out as dedicated social 
workers fighting against alleged injustices and oppression.” 199 They were accused of 
seeking to foster class hatred and conflict, cultivating unhappiness towards the 
political and economic state of affairs and working to create political instability.200 
Their strategy allegedly included using publications such as the Workers' Party's the 
Hammer, the Archdiocese's CN, and the JPC's Singapore Highlights and topical 
dossiers to spread their ideas.201  
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 According to the government, Cheng had used the Church as a means to 
promote his subversive agenda, allegedly intending CORD to serve as a Marxist 
united front.  He further admitted in a press interview on 9 June, to have been 
actively subverting young Catholics through Bible-study classes and other 
activities.202  He is said to have targeted the Church because many of its social 
teachings, notably liberation theology, coincided nicely with his Marxist-Communist 
ideas.203 
  The State claimed that even as Cheng was using the Church as a vehicle for 
subversion, other 'conspirators' were making use of other organizations to radicalize 
other segments of the population. Lawyers Tang Fong Har and Teo Suh Lung were 
said to have been working towards subverting the Law Society into a 'pressure 
group' by advocating that it expand its focus beyond the welfare of lawyers to 
political issues such as commentary on government policies; and promotion and 
protection of legal rights.204 In a similar vein, businessman Chew Kheng Chuan 
helped found the Third Stage, before moving on to infiltrating the Workers' Party, 
leaving the drama group ready for Singapore Polytechnic lecturer Chng Suan Tse to 
employ it as a pressure group which utilized its dramas to present alternative 
viewpoints and criticize the status quo, such as when the script for one of their plays, 
Esperanza, was rewritten to include "an element of class difference" after 
discussions with Tan.205 
 The government expanded the threat and scope posed by the 'conspiracy' 
on 5 July 1987 by claiming that they now believed that the alleged mastermind Tan 
Wah Piow was being manipulated by unknown players, possibly the Communist 
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Party of Malaya (CPM).206 A 21 April 1988 press statement claimed the 'Conspiracy' 
was a CPM plot to "make inroads into the English-educated groups using English 
educated intellectuals."207 The government sought to link the 'conspirators' to the 
CPM (which it asserted remained dedicated to the violent ouster of the Singaporean 
and Malaysian governments) through freed detainee Lim Li Kok who they claimed 
helped Tan secure locally-published books on the socioeconomic situation to 
provide the Party with reference material. 208   
 Between June and December 1987 the last of the detainees outside of 
Vincent Cheng were released and it appeared the 'Marxist Conspiracy' was drawing 
towards a close. On 18 April 1988, however, nine of the released detainees issued a 
joint statement in which they "denied being Marxist conspirators and said they were 
coerced into confessions on television … ill-treated during detention and were 
deprived sleep, held in 'freezing cold rooms', stripped, slapped and threatened." In 
response, the government immediately re-arrested eight of them, as well as Patrick 
Seong a lawyer for several of the ex-detainees. Only Tong Fong Har escaped re-
arrest by being overseas, having earlier travel led to the United Kingdom with ISD 
permission.209 
  The government promptly refuted all three claims made by the statement, 
asking why the ex-detainees had never taken their claims of ill-treatment to the 
court of law and had only released the statement months after their release.  The 
Ministry of Home Affairs further justified the re-arrests on the grounds that the 
retraction of the detainees' 'confessions' inherent in their statement meant that 
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they claimed or worse actually believed that their previous actions were legal and 
legitimate, so that they were likely to resume 'subversive' activities. 210 
  Plans for a Commission of Inquiry were announced by the government to 
investigate the detainees' allegations and the broader context for their statement. 
An arrest warrant was also issued for Tang.211 On 29 April ST reported that the eight 
re-arrested signatories had retracted their support for the statement and signed 
statutory declarations reaffirming their original statements to the ISD and their 
televised confessions, the retraction of which is a criminal offence; in light of which 
the planned Commission of Inquiry was scrapped.212  
 The 18 April statement was presented as a new 'plot' to damage the 
government's integrity and undermine Singapore's political stability and economic 
prospects by damaging investor's confidence.213 This new 'plot', the government 
claimed, was also aimed to make the 'Marxist conspiracy' an issue in the upcoming 
1988 elections to allow its opponents such as Francis Seow and detainee Patrick 
Seong to paint "a picture of [the incumbent] government that is dictatorial and not 
tolerant of dissent'".214 The Government also claimed that highly suspicious but 
circumstantial evidence suggested the possibility that United States State 
Department officials had influenced the 18 April statement with three signatories 
having had ties to American officials.215 The scope of the conspiracy was thus further 
widened to include a possible foreign 'plot'. Prime Minister Lee even postulated that 
Tan Wah Piow might have been a double-agent working for British intelligence 
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within the CPM.216 The 'Conspiracy' could only be said to have drawn to a close 
when those detained would all be released throughout 1989 and 1990, with Vincent 
Cheng being the last to be released on 29 June 1990.217  
The 'Marxist Conspiracy': the Archdiocese's response 
 The 'Marxist Conspiracy' was not exclusively limited to the Church, but 
involved other organizations in civil society as well. However, Catholic organizations 
such as the JPC, CORD, Catholic students' societies in the National University of 
Singapore and Singapore Polytechnic, the CCFW, YCW, and CN were directly 
targeted. 218 Furthermore, four of the sixteen detained on 21 May were full-time 
Church workers whilst six more were volunteers in church organizations. 219 
 The Archdiocese's initial response to the detentions appeared to be one of 
support for those detained, particularly the ten Church workers. A mass attended by 
"[m]ore than 2,500 concerned friends, relatives and well-wishers" at the Church of 
Our Lady of Perpetual Succour on 27 May was dedicated to the detainees, 
celebrated by the Archbishop and assisted by twenty three priests. Testimonials 
about the beliefs and the work of four of the detained workers were given by their 
loved ones who dismissed the government's claims that they were part of a covert 
communist network. Four letters of appeal were also sent to the Minister of Home 
Affairs between 22 and 24 May from the YCW, the JPC, the CCFW and the Catholic 
Students Society of the Singapore Polytechnic, requesting for the detainees' 
immediate release and the clearing of their names. The letters also voiced full 
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support for the four full-time Church workers and expressed their incredulity at the 
allegations.220  
 These initial signs of support were further substantiated by a statement 
issued by Archbishop Yong and his priests on 28 May after a four hour meeting with 
more than seventy priests that stated that they were "greatly perturbed at the 
arrests and the Ministry's statement."  The clergy further vouched for the ten Church 
workers by declaring that 
"[w]e affirm our confidence in and continued support for all the Catholic 
organizations mentioned in the Ministry's statement. To the best of our 
knowledge, the full-time workers have been fully committed to the work of 
the Catholic organizations … The six voluntary workers have generously 
contributed their time and talents to specific work in [those organizations]." 
It also reaffirmed that whilst "[t]he Catholic Church is totally opposed to 
Marxism/Communism which is contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ," it would 
continue to spread its social teachings even though they might be seen as 
'subversive'.221 
 The Archdiocese's support for the detainees continued in the form of a 14 
June issue of CN which published the 28 May statement as a joint pastoral letter 
dated 30 May on its front page.222 It also published a lengthy article on the support 
for the detainees from the Archdiocese such as the 27 May mass and the letters of 
appeal from Catholic organizations.223 In addition, the 14 June issue of CN provided a 
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detailed description of the operations of the various organizations implicated in the 
Conspiracy, stressing the completely legitimate nature of their activities.224 
 The conviction that the ten detained Church workers were only engaged in 
the application of the Church's social doctrine strengthened the perception that the 
arrests were unjust. The Archbishop's 28 May statement, entitled 'Justice must be 
seen to be done', voiced the belief that the Church workers were innocent, implying 
not a misunderstanding but rather a miscarriage of justice. This injustice was seen to 
be not just against members of the Archdiocese but against the body as a whole, 
happening "in our Church and to our Church [emphasis from source]."225   
 However, before the 14 June CN issue could be distributed, the government 
arranged a meeting with the Archdiocese that led to an abrupt about-turn in its 
position. On 31 May Prime Minister Lee contacted prominent lay Catholic Dr. Ee 
Peng Liang to ask him to arrange a meeting with other lay leaders; at Dr. Ee's 
suggestion the Archbishop was invited as well. After meeting with the Senate of 
Priests the next day to select his delegation Yong met with Lee on 2 June.226 During 
the course of the meeting, at which Ee was present as well, the delegation was 
allowed to view various documents in regard to Vincent Cheng that the government 
claimed proved his involvement in a 'Marxist Conspiracy'; they were offered a 
chance to read similar documents pertaining to the other detainees at another time. 
Yong was also reassured that the government was not targeting the Catholic Church 
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and that its workers had been detained on the basis of their personal involvement in 
'subversive' activities. 227 
  On the basis of the documents presented to him, the Archbishop at a 
follow-up press conference acknowledged that Cheng was indeed a 'subversive' and 
that "'the man himself admitted he was using the church", that the ISD arrests were 
justified and that the government version of events was indisputable fact. Although 
Yong and his retinue had only seen documents against Cheng, they declared 
themselves convinced of the validity of the accusations against all ten Church 
workers.  Yong added that he would be taking steps to ensure "there is no conflict 
between the Church and the State on this matter."228  
 The Archbishop proceeded to withdraw the 14 June issue of CN (printed but 
not distributed) pending the paper's change into what he described as "'a religious 
newspaper'."229 An article in its June 28 issue, summarized its revised editorial policy 
as striving for ”’[a] Christian formation through Christian information.’”230 This new 
editorial policy translated into a conscious decision to avoid commenting on 
Singaporean socio-political affairs; the 1988 re-arrests, for example, were treated as 
a non-event even as CN covered the detention of a number of Christian activists in 
Malaysia during the latter part of 1987 who had also been accused of being Marxists 
that had infiltrated Church organizations.231 
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Outside of avoiding commentary on Singaporean socio-political affairs 
however CN made no other changes to its content, attempting to continue business 
as usual. The paper never so much as commented on its preceding provocative 
orientation; much less publish an admission of wrongdoing. It continued to publish 
articles on the social teachings of the Church that had underlay the actions of those 
implicated during Spectrum; as evidenced by the regular column "The Church 
Teaches" which sought to explain the teachings of Gaudium et Spes and its relevance 
to Singaporean Catholics, which ran continuously from September 1986 through 
November 1987.  
"The Church Teaches" column, building on Gaudium et Spes, emphasized 
that the Church "can [and should] greatly help to make the human family and 
human history more truly human".232 It outlined several key tasks for Singaporean 
Catholics: First, promoting human rights. Second, helping the poor and needy 
throughout the world. Third, safeguarding the dignity of traditional marriage and the 
family. Fourth, seeking social justice by striving towards an equitable distribution of 
wealth and respecting the human dignity of all workers.  Fifth, using their rights to 
free assembly, speech, and communication to create a just political system in service 
of the common good of all people. Sixth, taking steps to cultivate a more Christian 
culture. Lastly, the column also urged Catholics to encourage world peace and unity 
between all peoples.  
The notable change brought about in the wake of the change in editorial 
policy was that discussion of these topics steered away from potentially provocative 
topics such as the rights of labour and the role of Catholics in the political sphere. 
Instead the paper focused on politically safer topics such as world peace and the 
                                                          
232
 “The Church Teaches - Church’s Role in Today's World,” CN, September 7, 1986. 
[74] 
 
cultivation of a proper Christian culture. Yet CN maintained uninterrupted 
supportive coverage of the activism of the Filipino Church, which could be an implicit 
call for Singaporean Catholics to follow that example.  
The Archbishop also suspended, forbade from preaching, and accepted the 
resignations from the implicated organizations of four priests: Fr Joseph Ho, 
chairman of the JPC; Fr Patrick Goh, national chaplain of the YCW and a member of 
the JPC; Fr Edgar D'Souza, associate editor of CN and Archdiocesan press liaison; and 
Fr Guillaume Arotcarena, director of the CCFW. Whilst the Archbishop did not assign 
them blame in any way, and may even have seen them as scapegoats to pacify the 
government, his acceptance of their resignations did imply that the organizations 
were in the wrong and that these priests were implicated and were being punished. 
To ensure that no other priests ran afoul of the government in the future, the 
Archbishop forbade his priests from mixing politics and religion in their preaching.233   
He also took steps against Catholic organizations implicated in the 
‘Conspiracy’, shutting down the CCFW and stating that the JPC’s future “would be 
the subject of serious reflection”; it was eventually shut down as well.234 This was in 
stark contrast to its consistent efforts at preserving its institutions when faced with 
similar confrontations with the State in the realm of education as discussed in the 
previous chapter. What then was the difference between the CCFW and the JPC and 
the Catholic schools that led the Archdiocese to sacrifice the former two whilst going 
as far as compromising its principles to preserve the latter? One factor was that the 
affected bodies in this instance were as previously discussed peripheral institutions 
of the Archdiocese in contrast the Catholic schools that were core institutions whose 
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loss would have been a massive blow. The Church was thus far less invested in 
preserving the CCFW and the JPC. 
This reduced desire to preserve the two bodies was compounded by the fear 
that preserving them and thus continuing to earn the State's ire that doing so might 
have caused would a great risk to the Archdiocese's broader institutional strength. 
This fear was reflected in comments by two senior priests that I have interviewed 
that opposing the government would have been a losing proposition with severe 
possible repercussions.235 These included the invocation of the ISA, which would 
have allowed the State to detain Church members and/or prohibit its organizations 
and publications;236 the withdrawal of vital government aid to Catholic schools; 
and/or any number of measures to attack the institutions of the local Church. In light 
of this, the Archdiocese pragmatically chose to sacrifice the two peripheral 
institutions so to preserve the others.  
This decision alongside the Archbishop's other actions were fully backed by 
the Vatican; a note from its Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations to its 
Singaporean counterpart summarized the various actions taken by Archbishop Yong 
to deescalate tensions between the local Church and the State, voiced its approval, 
and said it would encourage Yong to continue along these lines.237 
Why did the Archdiocese make an about-turn? 
 The Archbishop publicly made an about turn in his position after being 
shown evidence at the 2 June meeting. However some sources contend that the 
Archbishop's acceptance of the government's story resulted more from government 
intimidation than from any evidence it produced. Edgar D'Souza, now a former 
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priest, claimed that the Archbishop was under significant government pressure; 
accusing Lee of threatening the Archbishop with the use of the ISA against the 
Church if he did not "put his own house in order."238  
 D’Souza subsequently elaborated on his version of events, stating that based 
on the Archbishop’s personal account of the of the 2 June meeting and the follow-up 
press conference, Yong's statement accepting the government’s point of view was 
specifically crafted at the coaching of the Prime Minister to suggest he had come to 
accept the government’s view on his own rather than under pressure. D’Souza also 
claimed that the Archbishop had expected to issue the declaration in his usual 
manner as a signed statement via his press officer, D’Souza himself, but was instead 
forced to make an immediate public statement at a joint press conference with the 
Prime Minister, which unsettled Yong and left him feeling “’cornered’”.239  
 In D’Souza’s opinion the government’s behaviour at the 2 June meeting left 
the Archbishop feeling that the Church was faced with only two options: retract its 
support for its workers and their right to spread Catholic social teachings or else face 
a clash with the government. D’Souza recounted that when Yong came to see him in 
the CN office after the meeting to ask him to retract the 14 June issue, he "appeared 
to be very distraught." He added that during a 3 June meeting with him and the 
three other priests implicated in the 'Conspiracy', the Archbishop informed them 
that the government was intent on arresting them unless the Archdiocese managed 
to keep its "'house in order.'" D’Souza claimed that when Yong was asked by Goh 
whether any of them had acted contrary to the Church's teaching, he responded 
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that it was not what he thought that was important but what the government did, 
implying he was not fully on the same page as the State.240  
 Expectedly Lee's account of the events in his memoirs is in stark contrast to 
D'Souza's. In the three brief mentions of Operation Spectrum, Lee stood by his 
contention that those detained were Marxists associated with Tan Wah Piow who 
had infiltrated the Church, but he gave no details. In fact, Lee’s discussion centred 
mainly on discrediting D'Souza by denouncing him repeatedly as a "renegade priest" 
who was not present at the 2 June meeting and thus cannot give a truly accurate 
account of events.241 
 D'Souza's opinion is shared by the scholar Michael Barr who argues that 
during the 2 June meeting Lee was personally intimidating and directed Archbishop 
Yong not to give the sense that he was succumbing to government pressure. Barr 
believes that this was driven by Lee's then imminent retirement from the post of 
Prime Minister which led him to seek to "establish a firm pattern of effective 
authoritarian rule that he could be confident would outlast his premiership." Thus 
he demanded the absolute compliance of the Catholic Church to the government 
agenda and repeatedly made threats of "a full, unrestrained crackdown on the 
Church", so as to make the Church an example to broader Singaporean civil society 
of the consequences of excessive dissent.242  
 Barr's position that there was more to Spectrum than a mere suppression of 
a 'Marxist Conspiracy' is shared by a number of other scholars, though different 
                                                          
240




 Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to First : The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: 
Times Media, 2000), 137, 152, 221–222. 
242
 Barr, “Marxists in Singapore?,” 354–355, 59–360; Barr further extends on these 
arguments in: Michael   D. Barr, The Ruling Elite of Singapore - Networks of Power and 
Influence (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014). 
[78] 
 
scholars stress different aspects of the incident. Eugene Tan sees it as part of the 
State's attempts to manage religion as it showed how the government utilizes legal 
measures, in this case the ISA, to keep religion from dominating the public sphere 
and its own hegemony.243 Mathew Mathews argues that Spectrum had a 
transformative effect on the relations between the State and religion as it was a 
benchmark event that accelerated the State's "attempts to control religion, noting 
its power to destabilize political regimes."244 Jothie Rajah through an examination of 
the government's discourse about Spectrum, in particular a speech to Parliament in 
July 1987 by Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, concludes that the affair was 
aimed at delivering a message to Singaporeans that they "need to trust in their 
leaders' assessments, that the ruling elite knows more and knows better."245 
 Criticism of the government's narrative of the 'Conspiracy' was also 
expressed by a combined fact-finding mission sent to ascertain the situation in the 
wake of the 1987 arrests by the International Commission of Jurists, the 
International Federation of Human Rights and the Asian Human Rights Commission. 
The mission concluded that the televised 'confessions' central to the government's 
case were of dubious credibility, on several grounds: Vincent Cheng's 'confession' 
had in fact been taped over several sessions and heavily edited before being aired; 
the behaviour and/or language of detainees during their 'confessions' were 
inconsistent with what their loved ones describe, suggesting possible duress;  the 
'confessions' (including the "Tracing the Conspiracy" documentary) had presented 
the activities of the detainees selectively and out of context, and were furthermore 
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distorted by the interviewer. Moreover, the mission judged that the confessions 
were obtained after the detainees had been subjected to treatment "widely 
recognised to be a form of brainwashing." Even after being freed detainees were 
under constant surveillance by the ISD, and lived under "a real fear of being 
rearrested, interrogated and not released next time". Based on this assessment the 
mission concluded that there was no evidence of a 'Marxist conspiracy' and that the 
incident was an attempt by the ruling People's Action Party to suppress the 
emerging democratic opposition to its continued dominance. On the basis of these 
findings, it condemned the arrests as a violation of "[t]he fundamental principles of 
the rule of law and natural justice."246 
 Concerns over the detentions were also expressed from across the globe, 
accompanied by calls for the detainees' release or the laying of formal charges in 
court.247 By 15 August 1988, such calls had translated into the Singapore 
government having received over 400 protest letters from around the world.248  
 Locally as discussed earlier there was a fear within the Church that refusing 
to toe the State line would lead to a government crackdown. The Archdiocese was 
thus faced with two options: stand up for its belief in the innocence of its detained 
Church workers and organizations, thereby risking a conflict with the government; 
or to accept–at least publicly– the government's version of events and comply with 
its directives to rein in its activism. In the interests of preserving the bulk of its 
institution strength it chose the latter. 
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A brief comparison with the Jurong Industrial Mission (JIM) 
 Despite its prominence, Spectrum was however not the first instance in 
which the Singaporean State suppressed Christian activist activity; in 1971 it applied 
sufficient pressure against the Protestant led ecumenical JIM to cause it to shut 
down. Between 1966 and 1972, the JIM assisted residents in the developing Jurong 
area. For a time the JIM enjoyed encouraging success in its efforts to help improve 
the lives of the workers living in the new estate as it solved conflicts between rival 
groups of workers; successfully advocated for the opening of a second market and 
mosque in the area; negotiated with the Ministry of Health to set up a maternal and 
child health clinic; convinced the bus company to set up new routes in the area; and 
arranged for English tuition for working girls.249  
 However, in 1970 the JIM moved to focus on labour issues where it was felt 
the State was neglecting the needs of the workers. It began to critique labour 
conditions in Singapore and to organize disgruntled workers to press for change. For 
example, Vincent Cheng, who had joined the JIM in 1971, observed many labour 
violations at a local timber firm and helped to organize its workers to press for 
action.250  The JIM's shift to labour issues soon brought it into increasing conflict 
with the State. One key factor was that the JIM had in large part been steered into 
this direction by Ronald Fujiyoshi, a Japanese American who had joined in 1968.251 
The government could therefore paint the JIM's actions as an act of foreign 
interference.  
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 The State began applying pressure on the JIM's host Church, the Lutheran 
Church of Malaysia and Singapore (LCMS).  In July 1971, the Registrar of Societies 
informed leaders of the LCMS that should it be forced to take action, it would be 
without warning and amount to the deregistration of the LCMS and the confiscation 
of all its property. A further warning was issued in August, when representatives of 
the JIM were warned that its work could be subverted by agitators and were urged 
to work with the government.  In the face of such government pressure, the decision 
was made in November to shut down the mission at year’s end.252 
 Why did the events of 1987 lead to an ISA crackdown whilst the JIM was 
simply shut down without such fanfare? Why was Vincent Cheng detained as part of 
Spectrum and not in 1972, even though he was involved in both incidents? The 
fundamental difference, I argue, is the support of the parent Church. In the case of 
the JIM, the Church authorities readily responded to the government's warnings and 
promptly shut it down. In contrast, the Catholic Church in 1986 appeared to not 
heed the government's various warnings, prompting the stronger response of 
Spectrum. 
The long-term impacts of the 'Marxist Conspiracy' on the Archdiocese 
  The Archdiocese's desire to avoid a confrontation with the State was not 
limited to the immediate events of the 'Conspiracy' but can also be seen in its long-
term actions, beginning with its response to the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Act 1990 (MRHA). As discussed in the previous chapter, by the late 1980s the 
government had identified a sense of heightened religious tension, shown in its 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony White Paper to have been significantly 
influenced by the 'Conspiracy'. The government argued that Singapore's fragile 
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religious harmony must be protected through the enforcement of religious 
tolerance and moderation and by ensuring that politics would not bleed into 
religion.253 The MRHA of November 1990 was broadly based on the proposed 
legislation outlined in the White Paper. The Act allowed the government to issue 
restraining orders against any person suspected of: stoking inter-religious animosity; 
using religion as a front to promote any political party or cause to mask subversive 
activities, or to incite dissatisfaction against the President or government. The 
restraining orders would prevent their targets from engaging in the following 
activities without prior government consent: addressing verbally or textually any 
religious body on any subject as outlined in the order; engaging or supporting in any 
way in the production of any publication by a religious group; or holding a position 
on the editorial board of any religious group's publications.254 
  The Act further established a Presidential Council for Religious Harmony that 
would "consider and make recommendations" on the restraining orders along with 
analyzing matters concerning religious harmony brought before it by the 
government. The President’s confirmation would be required to issue restraining 
orders. The Act further stipulated that "[a]ll orders and decisions of the President 
and the Minister and recommendations of the Council made pursuant to this Act 
shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court."255 The MRHA thus 
defined the limits within which religious organizations would henceforth operate, 
completely reshaping the religious scene in Singapore. 
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 The Archbishop alongside twelve other Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and 
Christian religious leaders responded to the White Paper by expressing the Church's 
support for the proposed MRHA.256 In a February 1990 press statement, he hailed 
the aim of promoting religious harmony as "entirely praiseworthy". However, he 
also took the opportunity to express his concern over the government's ambiguous 
definition of what constituted politics. For politics in the narrow sense of party 
politics the Church had no issue with its separation from religion, as it is "the 
business of the layman." However, he noted, in a broader sense politics can mean 
the examination and execution of public affairs which like religion affects the totality 
of human life. For the government to apply this definition would effectively prohibit 
religious leaders from educating their coreligionists on the implications of 
government policies which affect aspects of their faith or morality.  He further 
argued that there were many issues where the secular and religious overlap and 
religious leaders should not be faulted for addressing the moral and religious 
aspects of such issues.257 
 This view was echoed by the Muslim religious authority, Mufti Syed Isa 
Semait, noting that for Muslims no separation of religion and politics is possible as 
Islam is all-encompassing, though he tempered this by arguing that he foresaw no 
problems so long as politicians did not interfere with the religious lives of Muslims. 
However, he contended that if the government was serious about separating politics 
and religion then things must go both ways and all politicians must cease 
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involvement in the management of mosques and religious groups as Malay 
Members of Parliament did at the time.258   
 At least one Protestant denomination also spoke out, though its response 
was more muted than that of the Archdiocese. In a February 1990 commentary, the 
Methodist Church stated that it shared the government's concerns about preventing 
inter-religious tensions and keeping religion and politics separate. The Methodist 
Church as an institution, it said, should not involve itself in party politics and should 
limit political involvement to issues of social injustice and problems while avoiding 
"covert manipulation of a religious body by a political party." However, the Church 
argued that religious leaders must be allowed to freely speak about controversial 
social issues and policies as part of the government's desired "consensus democracy 
in which alternative viewpoints and dissent are accommodated and participation 
encouraged."259 
 The Methodist commentary also critiqued the proposed MRHA on three 
counts. Firstly, given existing laws which met the same ends as the proposed Bill, the 
introduction of the MRHA could therefore be viewed as a political move to curb all 
opposition from the religious community. Secondly, the law could easily be abused. 
Thirdly, the law could not curb "the religious fervour and deep-rooted convictions", 
and the government's heavy-handed approach to Religion-State confrontations 
might backfire and further catalyze rather than neutralize clashes.260 
 The government responded to these calls through a speech by First Deputy 
Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, during the parliamentary debate on the MHRA on 
23 February 1990. Goh admitted that it was "not easy, and perhaps not possible, to 
                                                          
258
 “Archbishop and Mufti Call for Clearer Definition of ‘Politics,’” ST, January 11, 1990. 
259
 Cheong Seng Hock et al., “A Response to the ‘White Paper’ on Maintenance of Religious 





separate our spiritual life from our political day-to-day life" but asserted that in the 
interest of preserving religious harmony it was necessary to attempt to do so. The 
objective of the MHRA was to "try and separate the authority of the religion from 
the authority of the State." If a person wished to oppose the government on the 
basis of religious conviction, Goh said, they are free to do so, but as an individual 
and not as part of a religious group. Thus religious groups can never gain control of 
State authority, which would prompt inter-religious tension and possibly even 
conflict. Finally, Goh concluded that any abuses of the MRHA would be ultimately 
safeguarded against via the ballot box as any who viewed the authorities as abusing 
it could freely seek to unseat them through the electoral process.261 Goh did not, 
however, provide a clear definition of religion instead reiterating that only 
individuals may engage in politics; nor did the Act itself contain any explanation on 
what constituted politics.262 
 It should be noted that the MRHA was not needed to suppress threats, as 
the 'Conspiracy' proved that the government had at its disposal the means to deal 
with threats. The ISA alongside the Sedition Act and Penal Code already served this 
purpose. Thus the MHRA constituted a refinement to the Government's arsenal 
rather than an expansion of its capabilities.263 In fact, the new law was not used until 
2008, even in cases where its enforcement would seem logical, such as the 2005 and 
2006 cases of bloggers prosecuted for religiously offensive postings.  These cases 
were prosecuted under the Sedition Act, not the MRHA.  Jothie Rajah argues that 
the purpose of the other security laws is not to preserve public order but rather to 
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maintain "State dominance of public discourse"; she specifically cites Zulfikar 
Mohamad Shariff and his website, Fateha.com, which questioned the "State's 
management of 'religion'" particularly Islam and was subsequently told that he was 
open to charges of defamation, sedition and being in breach of the MRHA. Rajah 
concludes that "[a]ll potential violators of 'religious harmony' are more potently 
instructed by imprisonment … under the Sedition Act than by restraining orders 
under the MRHA."264 
 The MHRA, did represent a formal expansion of government power to 
counter threats in the religious sphere and its ambiguous scope raised the possibility 
of abuse particularly given its extra-judicial nature. However, the Archdiocese never 
publicly pushed for a definition of what constituted 'politics' beyond the 
Archbishop's initial statement. Unwilling to risk a confrontation with the 
government, the Archdiocese satisfied itself with Goh's lacklustre reply which failed 
to even address the crux of its complaint and chose to go on as usual despite the 
looming spectre of an ambiguously worded law that could suppress anything the 
government deemed unacceptable by defining it as 'political'. 
 Another long-lasting impact of the 'Conspiracy' is the emergence of a culture 
of self-censorship within the Archdiocese of any content that might prompt another 
confrontation with the State, above and beyond the contents of CN and church 
sermons. There is a sense amongst Catholics themselves about the need to be 
cautious about crossing the line into politics as seen by: the Katong Catholic Book 
Centre stopping the import of some potentially controversial titles; laity telling 
instructors of courses on the Church's social teaching at SPI during the late 1980s 
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that what they taught was unacceptable; and Catholics being fearful to attend 
seminars related to the rights of workers or the plight of migrant workers.265   
 This self-censorship remains prevalent with many interviewees talking about 
the reluctance of Catholics to discuss anything that might be construed as being 
political particularly the Church's teachings on social justice. Moreover, because the 
withdrawal of the 14 June CN meant that the Archdiocese never presented its own 
point of view, many Catholics of all ages have had to rely on the mainstream media 
and/or school textbooks for information, thus hearing only the government's version 
of events.  Although many of them are sceptical of the government's account, a 
feeling of apathy towards the events of 1987 has meant that few chose to explore 
the alternative viewpoints found in the publications of the detainees, their 
supporters, and scholars. The government's account of events thus remains the 
dominant narrative in the minds of Singaporean Catholics. 
The 'Marxist Conspiracy': a summary 
 The 'Marxist Conspiracy' served to give the Archdiocese a choice between 
compliance with the government, abandoning its detained Church workers to the 
mercies of the State and compromising its efforts at social activism; or standing by 
its workers and teachings, thus risking a broader government assault against it. After 
initial resistance it eventually chose the former option, curtailing its own social 
action, retracting its support from the detainees, and sacrificing some of its 
institutions such as the CCFW and the JPC to preserve the rest of its institutional 
strength. The arrests would also make the Archdiocese more cautious in its dealings 
with the State as evidenced in its lack of significant protest in the face of the 
ambiguous MHRA and its own self-censorship.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 As demonstrated in the overview of some of the internal aspects of the 
Archdiocese's institutional development discussed in Chapter 2, a major focus of the 
Archdiocese during the period of this study has been the development and 
refinement of institutions to expand its capabilities. It appointed its first local 
Archbishop in 1977 and consolidated the leadership of the entire island's Catholics 
under its authority. It localized theological training of priests and the laity through 
the foundation of SFXMS in 1983 and SPI in 1978.  It also refined the scope of lay 
participation through the creation of parish councils.  
 These efforts by the Archdiocese to consolidate and expand its influence as 
a national Church however did not take place within a vacuum but rather in an 
environment where the government through its efforts at nation-building was 
expanding its influence over Singaporean society, including education and religion. 
In terms of education, the Singapore government had since independence opened 
many new government schools that not only vastly increased the scope of the 
national education system but had in doing so increasingly pressured the non-
government schools to conform to its standards to maintain parity.266 In religious 
matters, the State sought to define the roles which faiths could play within the 
community and thus took steps to discipline any religious bodies and persons, such 
as the JIM and to those implicated in Spectrum, which crossed the boundaries it set. 
This desire by the government to dictate the limits within which religious bodies can 
operate was ultimately codified in the form of the MRHA. The State was thus in 
effect using nation-building to shape Singapore in accordance with its ideals. 
However, the State's ideals did not always coincide with those of the Church. As a 
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result, tensions and conflicts on occasion arose between the Archdiocese and the 
State. When faced with such a situation, the Archdiocese chose to take steps to 
avoid letting these conflicts escalate into a full-blown attack on the Church by the 
State.  
 In the realm of education, the Church depended heavily on government 
financial aid for the continued operation of its schools. Failure to comply with 
policies such as the sterilization priority scheme and the introduction of Religious 
Knowledge as a compulsory subject would have meant a withdrawal of such aid, 
forcing the Archdiocese to either withdraw entirely from the realm of education or 
to restructure its schools into a private self-financing system with the closure of 
many schools to keep the others afloat. These would have been a major blow to the 
Church as it would amount to a drastic scaling back of its core institutions and thus 
its ability to reach out to broader Singaporean society. Compliance under protest 
which expressed the Church's opposition whilst not threatening the operation of its 
schools was the option chosen. However, as in the case of independent schools, 
when the option for limited compliance was available, the Archdiocese chose this 
option instead.  
 This reluctant and minimal compliance was demonstrated during the debate 
about the sterilization priority scheme when the mission schools had to weigh the 
moral burden of compliance against the threat of closure and thus ending their 
contributions to Singapore.267 As they continue to operate to this day, their decision 
was clear. Simultaneously the schools also sought to minimize this burden by 
limiting compliance with controversial policies when possible and complying only 
under protest when it was not. This reflected a strong sense of pragmatism within 
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the Archdiocese, whereby it sought a middle way to avoid offending the government 
whilst still expressing its objection to the State's contentious policies. 
 This approach was even more evident in the Archdiocese's handling of 
Spectrum. Faced with the potential of a large scale crackdown on the local Church, 
the Archdiocese backed down, demonstrating that it prioritized its broader 
institutional strength over its support for the detainees or the continued operation 
of the implicated peripheral institutions. This sacrificing of peripheral institutions is 
in stark contrast to the lengths the Church went to preserve its schools, core 
institutions, suggesting that it was willing to shut down organizations with a focused 
and thus relatively small impact on a smaller group of people, such as the JPC and 
CCFW, but was unwilling to do the same in the case of its schools with their ability to 
potentially affect larger numbers of people.  
 The Church leadership’s decisions evidenced in the case studies examined in 
this thesis had several long-term consequences. First of all, the strategic pragmatism 
demonstrated by the Archdiocese on various occasions generated opposition among 
clergy and lay people who felt that it was compromising on Church teachings and, in 
the case of Operation Spectrum, sacrificing its own institutions and individual 
servants in order to appease the State. Second, particularly after Spectrum, the 
Archdiocese adopted a policy which considerably reduced both its voice and its role 
as a force of social change. Finally, the decision to fully integrate mission schools 
into the national education system has led to perceptions that the Catholic ethos of 
these schools has been sacrificed in the process. 
The Church in the eyes of its flock 
[91] 
 
 The strategic compromises on the Church’s part, while perhaps justifiable in 
terms of its overall strategy for strength and even survival, had a clear impact on the 
morale of Singaporean Catholics. One clear example of this impact can be observed 
in the way the Archdiocese's response to Spectrum served to undermine the trust 
that some Catholics had in the Church to support them in times of trouble even 
when they had been directly engaged in its work. Nicholas Leow in his Honours 
Thesis on the different memories surrounding the 'Marxist Conspiracy' identified in 
many of the accounts of detainees and their loved ones "deeply-felt feelings of 
betrayal especially towards the Catholic Church which refused to support them."268 
This lack of trust in the Archdiocese also underlies the self-censorship by Catholics in 
the aftermath of 1987 as the 'Conspiracy' served as a deterrent to engaging in 
potentially political activity. How widespread such feelings run through the broader 
Catholic community is something that would require more research to determine, 
but it is clearly there. 
 Even before the crisis of the ‘Marxist crisis’, however, decisions by the 
Church leadership had already generated dissatisfaction within the community. As 
early as the sterilization priority issue, there had been those opposed to the policy of 
complying under protest such as the DCJP.269 Likewise many of the protests by 
Catholics against the RK experiment and the introduction of independent schools 
may have been directed against the Archdiocese's compromises as much as State 
policies. In both these cases, with the sterilization priority issue serving as a 
precedent that the Archdiocese prioritized the continued operation of its schools 
even over its doctrine, it was a foregone conclusion that in both cases, with only the 
Archdiocese's opinions at stake, that the local Church would implement the 
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government's policies. In light of this, the protests by Catholics against the State 
policies were not just critiques of State initiatives but also attempts to provide 
arguments to spur the Archdiocese to stand up for its principles and oppose the 
State and thus implicit critiques of the local Church's pragmatism. 
Reducing the Church’s role in society  
 A second consequence of the Archdiocese's compromises with the State was 
a reduction in the scope of its own social activism, particularly in the area of labour 
policies, where the Church became much more cautious about voicing its 
opinions.270 However it failed to silence the Church’s voice completely, as the 
Archdiocese continued its role as a civil society voice on moral issues but with a 
more cautious tone to avoid offending the State. This was demonstrated by its 
criticisms of the 2004 plan to open casinos in Singapore, when despite expressing its 
respect for the rationale behind the policy and the government’s right to make the 
decision, the Church still added its voice to calls by various religious authorities 
against the legalization of casino gambling. Archbishop Nicholas Chia in a September 
2004 statement argued that the societal cost of opening casinos in Singapore would 
outweigh any economic benefits. He argued that "'[t]his industry provides a product 
that … has been shown to cause considerable social and financial hardship to 
individuals, families and communities and [creates] the danger of the exploitation of 
the consumer and his weakness[,] … [whilst simultaneously] 'undermining the work 
ethic.'"271 The Catholic Church was joined in its opposition by other religious 
organizations such as the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers 
Association; 272 and the National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) (which 
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represents many of the Protestant Churches) which issued a statement criticizing 
the Casinos as "against the national interest" because they would "undermine 
values" and "introduce more social ills." 273  
 Despite this strong opposition, in April 2005 the government announced its 
decision to proceed with the casinos. Defending the decision in parliament, Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Leong declared that the casinos were in the national interest to 
prevent Singapore from being eclipsed by its competitors in its drive to be a 
cosmopolitan and open Asian city. Acknowledging that many religious groups still 
opposed the casinos, Lee sought to downplay their opposition by arguing that they 
had demonstrated their acceptance, albeit under protest, by their willingness "to 
cooperate with the Government to help to tackle problem gambling". 274 The 
Archbishop responded by issuing a statement expressing regret over the decision 
but took no further action to urge the government to change its mind. 275 This was a 
far cry from the 1980s, when the Church had brushed off and at times even outright 
refused to recognize any potential economic rationale behind government policies 
and instead focused entirely on what it saw as the injustices that the policies 
generated.  
 Thus despite the shock of Spectrum, the Archdiocese has continued to play 
an active part in commenting on social and moral issues in Singapore. This can again 
be observed in June 2014, when the debate over homosexuality flared up as a result 
of the launch of a WearWhite movement by a Muslim teacher as a counter protest 
to Singapore's annual Pink Dot gay rights rally. The movement was joined by a 
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prominent Protestant pastor and an affiliated network of churches.276 Most 
churches, including the local Catholic Church, however took a more cautious 
approach, stating objections to homosexual practices on doctrinal grounds but 
condemned neither the rally nor homosexuals and instead criticizing discrimination 
against the homosexual community. This view was summarized in an NCCS 
statement.277 The Archdiocese echoed the NCCS's more moderate position. In a 21 
June statement, Archbishop William Goh stressed the Church’s opposition to the 
homosexual lifestyle as contrary to "the family, comprising a father, mother and 
children, [which it maintains] remains the basic building block of society". However, 
he condemned any and all discrimination against homosexuals as he argued that 
"the Church has always looked on each individual as being a child of God, made in 
His image and likeness and is therefore worthy of love and respect."278 
 Moreover, it should be noted that the Church's social action has never been 
limited to the critique of society alone. In its efforts to uphold Gaudium et Spe's 
exhortation to work towards the betterment of humanity it has continued to 
provide education through its mission schools and welfare to the less fortunate 
through such institutions as the Catholic Welfare Services and homes for the aged 
and other welfare facilities.279 Therefore, its sacrificing of institutions targeted by 
Spectrum may have been a loss but it only served as a reduction, not the elimination 
of all its means of social action. On the whole, however, it has become considerably 
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less vocal and certainly less confrontational on social issues than it had been before 
Operation Spectrum. This is particularly evident when the Singaporean Church is 
compared with its counterparts in, for example, the Philippines or Hong Kong. 
Integration into the government educational system: how “Catholic” are the 
Catholic schools? 
 Finally, we must consider one of the most significant examples of Church 
pragmatism: the full integration of the mission schools into the national educational 
system. This decision, of course, covers not only the specific schools which could 
have gone independent but all other Catholic schools as well, which despite their 
reputation as “mission schools” are obliged to subordinate their “religious” 
character to the requirements of the Ministry of Education in order to receive 
financial and infrastructural support. As a result, many Singaporean Catholics share a 
perception that the Catholic ethos of these schools has declined over the years. This 
perception can be seen as early as a July 1977 Seminar on Moral Education in 
Catholic Schools that was organized by the CSC, where it was noted that there had 
been debate about how mission schools should maintain their character. 
Throughout the seminar the lack of a Catholic atmosphere in mission schools was 
brought up repeatedly with participants at the seminar's first workshop articulating 
the impression that too little time was devoted to religious instruction and that 
there needed to be more. Gabrielite Bro. Emmanuel, for example, observed that 
many mission schools find it hard to find time to teach religious or moral education 
at all, which has had a negative impact on their overall Christian atmosphere. One 
parent bluntly stated that some Catholic schools were "abandoning moral and 
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religious education or at best masking it behind the title ethics", commenting that 
even the seminar had “conveniently left [religion] out" of its title.280 
 These fears came to the fore once again in the 1990s, coinciding with the 
appearance in the ST of school rankings based on academic performance.281 The 
introduction of ranking led to increased competitiveness between schools and 
amplified the pressure for Catholic schools to achieve academic excellence, 
potentially at the expense of their Catholic ethos as they were more tempted than 
ever to reallocate limited resources away from activities fostering Catholic identity 
to more academic programs.  
 The perception of a declining Catholic ethos in the mission schools was 
highlighted by a 1992 document published by the Catechetical Commission, wherein 
a "gradual dilution of the Catholic ethos of [Catholic] schools" was identified.282 This 
was followed by a more substantive report by the Catholic Education Committee in 
1996 which acknowledged that there was a "deepening concern on the part of the 
Church as to the 'Catholicity'" of the mission schools in the 1990s.283  
 Within this same period, a number of letters from the public were also 
published in CN that echoed this concern. One letter published in March 1994 
expressed the writer’s impressions that Catholic schools were "rather reticent about 
religion, [particularly] as compared to the Protestant mission schools."284 Other 
writers expressed concern over the imposition by the mission schools of minimum 
academic requirements for admissions, reducing the options available for a Catholic 
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education for less academically inclined children, who would have to attend secular 
neighbourhood schools instead.285 Thus mission schools by setting these academic 
entry requirements (in conformance with the broader agenda of Singaporean 
schools) were seen as valuing academic performance over taking in Catholic 
students to maintain their religious ethos. 
 The public's concerns over the Catholic ethos in the mission schools was 
exemplified by a letter to CN published in September 1996, whose writer outrightly 
questioned how Catholic the Catholic schools of Singapore really were, arguing that 
attention to the maintenance and improvement of a school's ranking served as the 
"ultimate distraction" from maintaining its Catholic identity. She cited the examples 
of her children's experiences in Catholic schools, saying that her daughter was 
taught incorrect information about the faith and that during her son's years in 
secondary school no spiritual retreats or Masses were held.286  
 The reasons that underlay this perception require more research. However, I 
argue that one contributory factor is that as the mission schools became increasingly 
integrated into the national education system the Archdiocese repeatedly made 
compromises to its principles to accommodate policies such as the priority 
admission scheme. To some Catholics the Church's compliance under protest to the 
sterilization criterion is a compromise on its beliefs.287 For them, being Catholic 
meant staying true to Catholic principles, so that compromise on this issue 
weakened the schools’ Catholicity. Similarly, they believed that compromises on 
other issues such as RK had served to make principals and teachers of Catholic 
schools afraid of promoting Catholic identity as they lacked confidence that the 
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Archdiocese would support them should their actions arouse the ire of the 
government288 How prevalent such thinking was is something that will require a 
broader survey of Catholic feelings on the issue, however it is clear that it influenced 
at least some Catholics. 
 More fundamentally, the decision to integrate virtually the entire mission 
school network into the national education system also meant that these schools 
had to place increasing focus on academic excellence, so as not to fall behind 
national standards. It is significant that none of the letters referred to above 
suggested that the two objectives of academic excellence and strong spiritual 
formation were mutually exclusive or that it was unrealistic for a school to pursue 
both simultaneously. Nor did anyone raise the possibility of the mission schools 
going private in order to become more “Catholic”, suggesting that the Catholic 
public preferred that they remain within the national education system. With this in 
mind, it can be argued that the integration of the mission schools into the national 
system was ultimately the most successful aspect of the Archdiocese's institutional 
development. Despite the misgivings of some members of the Church, it was a 
decision that was broadly acceptable to Catholics and amounted to the best of both 
worlds, as through the integration the schools satisfied the State whilst at the same 
time remained vehicles through which the Church could articulate some of its 
Catholic ethos. 
An assessment of how the Church fared between 1972 and 2001 
 In terms of its development as an autonomous national church, the 
Archdiocese of Singapore between 1972 and 2001 was an undeniable success.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, it has localized its leadership through the transition to 
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local Archbishops and the end of the state of dual jurisdiction. It also through the 
foundations of SPI and SFXMS which greatly reduced its reliance on foreign 
resources to provide vital theological training to its laity and clergy. 
 However, over the long term it has not been as successful in its role as the 
voice of Catholic principles in Singapore. The consequences of its repeated 
compromises when in conflict with the State has undermined its ability to spread its 
messages both through the loss of outreach bodies like the JPC and CCFW, and 
through induced self-censorship. At the same time, the strength of the Catholic 
principles that the Archdiocese conveyed has also been diluted by the repeated 
failure to stand up for them when faced with government pressure. These failings 
serve to further weaken the Archdiocese's effectiveness at spreading Catholic 
teachings, a task that already faces the constraints of a multi-religious society where 
the Church must take care not to offend other religions through aggressive 
proselytization. That said, the Archdiocese cannot be wholly faulted for its lacklustre 
performance in its role as the disseminator of Catholic ideals as it was merely doing 
the best it could within the limitations placed upon it by the State. Could it be more 
aggressive in pushing the Catholic message? Of course, but doing so would put it in 
conflict with the State, either as a result of other religious groups crying foul at the 
Church's behaviour or it crossing the limits that the State prescribed it. Such a 
conflict could lead to a full-scale State crackdown on the Church that would leave it 
devastated and thus should be avoided. 
Areas of future research 
 Before concluding this thesis, I would like to outline several issues that were 
discussed that warrant a more detailed examination than is possible here: First, the 
Archdiocese's role in education deserves more coverage through the examination of 
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other issues such as the founding of Catholic Junior College; and the 1984 Graduate 
Mothers Scheme which gave priority to the children of university graduate mothers 
during the Primary One registration exercise. The effect of the impact on the mission 
schools and the Archdiocese as a whole of the government's changing educational 
policies, such as the perception of a declining Catholic ethos, is also worth further 
exploration. Second, Operation Spectrum also deserves a more comprehensive 
overview that incorporates more points of view beyond the Archdiocesan focus this 
thesis has employed. Finally, a detailed history of the Archdiocese incorporating 
material from its newly established archive remains to be written when it is made 
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